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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
In March of 1972, the British Government announced the enactment of 
the Northern Ireland (Temporary Provisions) Act of 1972 which suspended 
the operation of Stormont, the Parliament of Northern Ireland. The Act 
instituted direct rule by the British Government and ended over fifty 
years of devolution under the Government of Ireland Act of t.920. The 
imposition of direct rule dcamatized the failure of Prime Minister Brian 
1. 
Faulkner's Government to end the terrorism and violence in Northern 
Ireland. The violence was accompanied by the breakdown of the political 
system which illustrated the failure of successive Governments of 
Northern Ireland to effectively integrate the sizable Catholic minority 
into the political system. As a rei;;ult, the problem of political 
integration has become a primary concern to all of the parties affected, 
whether they favor or oppose the increased participation of Catholics in 
the politics of Northern Ireland. 
The study of the problem of political integration in Northern 
Ireland must focus on two fundamental questions: first, why did the 
political system of Northern Ireland fail to integrate the Catholic 
minority? What role did religion play in the political malintegration 
of Northern Ireland? What role did Catholic nationalism play? The 
second fundatnental question is: what can be done to promote political 
integration in Northern Ireland? Once the factors that led to the 
1 
2 
breakdown of the political system are identified, wha,t solutions are 
available? What are the elements of a political solution and what are 
the prospects for peace in the future of Northern Ireland? The answers 
to these questions are essential to an understanding of the viability of 
Northern Ireland as a political entity. Before the presentation of 
hypotheses that will attempt to shed some light on these questions, it 
is necessary to have a clear understanding of the problem of political 
integration as it relates to Northern Ireland. 
Definition of the Problem 
Purpose 
Northern Ireland is torn by political violence and terrorism. 
Indeed, Northern Ireland was created when intense conflict in Ireland 
between Protestants and Catholics led to its partition into two separate 
political entities. Northern Ireland is composed of six of the nine 
historic counties of Ulster and is separated from the other twenty-six 
counties that comprise the Republic of Ireland by an international 
boundary. In the fifty years of its existence as a separate political 
entity, Northern Ireland has struggled with the problem of integrating 
a sizable Catholic minority into the political system. By almost any 
standard it has failed in that effort. That it failed is not as 
surprising as the fact that Northern Ireland has been able to exist for 
fifty years in an atmosphere of hatred, fear, and distrust. On March 
20, 1973, the British Government published its long awaited White Paper 
entitled, "Northern Ireland Constitutional Proposals" in which it 
outlined a new constitution for Northern Ireland. The purpose of this 
thesis is to examine the factors involved in Northern Ireland's failure 
3 
to achieve political integ1=ation and to analyze and evaluate the British 
White Paper as a means of promoting political integration. 
Definition of Political Integration 
In his book entitled,!! Theory of Political Integration, Claude Ake 
has written that "In essence, the problem of political integration is 
one of developing a political culture and inducing commitment to it.111 
Ake has also written that: 
A 
,, A political system is integrated to the extent that the 
minimal units (individual political actors) develop in the 
course of political interaction a pool of commonly accepted 
norms regarding political behavior and a commitment to ~he 
political behavior patterns legitimized by these norms. 
Besides defining the extent to which a political system is integrated, 
Ake also defines a malintegrated political system. He has written that 
"In malintegrated political systems, the emphasis is on effective rather 
3 than on legitimate means of pursuing political goals." Jacob and Teune 
have written that the people in an integrated community are held 
4 
together by mutual ties and feelings of identity and self-awareness. 
According to Myron Weiner, political integration is "the process of 
bringing together culturally and socially discrete groups into a single 
1 Claude Ake, A ·theory.£.!: Political Integration (Homewood, Illinois, 
1967), P• 1. 
2Ibid., P• 3. 
3Ibid., P• 4. 
4Philip E. Jacob and Henry Teune, "The Integrative Process: Guide-
lines for Analysis of the Bases of Political Communities," The Integra-
tion of Political Communities, eds. Philip E. Jacob and James V. Toscano 
(Philadelphia, 1964), p. · 4. 
territorial unit and the establishment of a national identiy." 5 
Finally, Karl Deutsch sees political integration as 
a condition achieved by political communities in which violence 
is excluded and there are stable expectations of peace among 
the participating.units of groups, whether or got there has 
been a merger of their political institutions. 
In this thesis political integration will be defined as a process 
whereby a disaffected segment of a political system is disposed to 
accept the legitimacy and political authority of the legal regime, and 
that closely linked to the concept of political integration are the 
concepts of legitimacy7 and political authority. 8 The concepts of 
legitimacy and political authority are important to an explanation of 
political integration; their significance to the problem of political 
integration in Northern Ireland will be discussed in greater detail 
later. 
Problems for Discussion 
The question whether or not Northern Ireland has a malintegrated 
political system seems almost absurd to anyone even remotely aware of 
5Myron Weiner, "Political Integration and Political Development," 
Political Development and Social Change, eds. Jason L. Finkle and 
Richard w. Gable (New York, 1966), P• 551. 
6Robert J. Jackson and Michael B. Stein, "The Issue of Political 
Integration," Issues in Comparative Politics, eds. Robert J. Jackson 
and Michael B. Stein (New York, 1971), P• 117. 
7Legitimacy involves the principle or principles on which a regime 
bases its right to govern. See Carl J. Friedrich, Man and His Govern-
~' PP• 232-246. 
8Political authority is the influence a regime derives from a 
willing acceptance by the subjects of its claim to rule. See Jack c. 
Plano and Robert E. Riggs, Dictionary of Political Analysis, P• 6, and 
Carl J. Friedrich,~ and His Government, PP• 216-231. 
the current political situation in that country. While it is undesir-
able for the purposes of this thesis to go into great detail to 
establish that Northern Ireland has a malintegrated political system, 
it is equally undesirable to asstnne the obvious and assert that the 
system is malintegrated. Therefore, attention to this problem, however 
brief, is needed to establish this basic premise. This analysis will 
focus upon the intervention by British troops, the imposition of direct 
rule by the British Government, and the level of political violence as 
indicators of malintegration. 
5 
If it is shown that Northern Ireland is malintegrated politically, 
it is necessary to consider the causes of the malintegration. Here it 
will be hypothesized that the malintegration of Northern Ireland is a 
direct result of political, social, and economic discrimination against 
Catholics by the Protestant majority. This study of political discrimi-
nation will focus upon electoral practices, disenfranchisement of 
Catholics in local elections, the treatment of Catholics while under 
arrest by the authorities, and the administration of justice in Northern 
Ireland. Discrimination in social relations will be examined in terms 
of the amount of interaction between the two communities in areas such 
as intermarriage, education, and housing patterns. The attitudes of 
Catholics and Protestants toward each other will also be examined to 
determine their effect on political integration. Finally, the examina-
tion of economic integration will focus upon discrimination in the 
hiring of Catholics in both the public and private sectors. Discrimi-
nation generally has caused many Catholics to question the legitimacy of 
the legal regime and to reject its authority. If the hypothesis is 
verified, a corollary to it is that the removal of discriminatory 
practices, especially on the part of the Government, is necessary for 
the future political integration in Northern Ireland. 
6 
The existence of discrimination, if verified, does not completely 
explain the problem of political integration in Northern Ireland. 
Discrimination against Catholics may provide answers as to why that 
group is discontented with the political system, but it does not explain 
why there is discrimination in the first place and why the situation in 
Northern Ireland was allowed to deteriorate to such a point that the 
collapse of the politic~l system became inevitable. First, it is 
necessary to examine the cleavages that divide Northern Ireland. The 
most i11fortant cleavage is based on religious affiliation. Religious 
cleavage has resulted in the emergence of a Catholic subculture within a 
Protestant dominated political system, and in the rejection of the 
values of this system by the minority. So pervasive is the religious 
cleavage that other cleavages in Northern Ireland, such as class, racia~ 
and economic differences, are articulated in terms of religious affilia-
tion, Nationalism is another cleavage that is important in understanding 
the conflict in Nqrthern Ireland. The question of Irish nationalism 
also divides the people of Northern Ireland along religious lines. 
Besides examining the cleavages in Northern Ireland we must study 
other factors involved in political malintegration. One must ask why 
the existing government in Nqrthern Ireland was unable or unwilling to 
cope with the demands and discontent of the Catholic minority. Here it 
hypothesized that the failure of the constitutional system established 
by the Government of Ireland Act of 1920 resulted from: (1) the 
implementation of an inadequate solution to the "Irish Question" at the 
time of the partition of Ireland; (2) the domination of Northern Ireland 
by a single political party throughout its existence; and (3) the 
failure of the British Government to assume full responsibility for the 
governing of Northern Ireland. 
7 
A study of the;problem of political integration in Northern Ireland 
of necessity shpuld tackle the question of a possible solution to the 
conflict. Any solution will have to take ;into account, the interests of 
the Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland, the Republic of 
Ireland, and Great Britain. These four parties have a major interest in 
the future of Northern Ireland. The proposals contained in the White 
Paper will be analyzed in terms of the interests of the four parties 
mentioned above. The analysis will focus upon the factors that have 
been identified as being crucial in the breakdown of the previous 
constitutional 'order. Specifically, this will involve:, (1) proposals 
that deal· with ending discrimination against Catholics; (2) efforts to 
increase the participation of Catholics in the new government; (3) 
efforts to end the domination of one political party in the new govern-
ment; (4) proposals that involve the maintenance of law and order; 
(5) the safeguarding of individual.human rights; and (6) the future 
relationships of Northern Ireland, Great Britain, and the Republic of 
Ireland. The analysis will' of necessity involve some description of the 
powers and structure of the new gov:ernment of Northern !~eland. In 
addition, some of the :experiences of other nations that have confronted 
the problem of political integration will be examined to provide 
insights concerning a workable solution for Northern Ireland. 
Finally, it should be noted that the problem of political integra-
tion is one that could take. several generations to solve. A constitu-
tional solution by itself is not enough. Three hundDed years of living 
8 
together on the same island has not br.ought Catholics· and Protestants 
together and certainly the proposals in the British White Paper will not 
do it overnight. Majo.r economic and. social problems as well, as politi-
cal difficulties confront Northern Ireland. These problems will not be 
solved "'l~sily. The final hypothesis to be. posed is that the changes in 
the political institutions, of Northern Ireland suggested by Gl:eat 
Britain in, its White Paper provide the basis for a workable solution to 
the problem of political· integration in Norther.n Ireland. The verifica-
ti.on of. this hypothesis is beyond the scope of this thesis, since it may 
be years before it is known whether or not the proposals will work. The 
thrust of the hypothesis is that while the necessary elements for a 
political solution are contai.ned, in the l-lhite Paper, it is for the 
people of Northern Ireland to make them work. 
Literature Review 
For the past three and a half years, the political situation in 
Northern Ir,eland has been one of such intensity that the word· "·explo.-::.· 
sive't is somehow inadequate to describe it. It is a problem that is 
fascinating as well as frustrating for the resear·cher. I;t is quite 
possible that after gai.ning some familiarity with the political s.itua-
tion in NQrthern Ireland, the reader will agree with observation that 
'·"Anyone wh0 isn't confused here doesn't. really understand what is going. 
"9 on.,'. 
W:hat goes on in Northern Ireland has been approached in a number of 
ways. Journalist have provided vivid accounts of the civil rights 
9Qµoted in Richard Rose, Governing Without Consensus: An Irish 
Perspective (Boston, 19-71), P•· .113 •. 
marches and the rioting that have occurred since the late 1960' s. 
Unfortunately, there has been a tendency to distort the situation, 
usually in favor of the Catholics. Also, journalists tend to focus on 
the discrimination against Catholics and deal only superficially with 
other factors involved in the political malintegration of Northern 
Ireland. 10 However, the works of these authors have provided valuable 
sources of factual information on Northern Ireland. 
Many authors on Northern Ireland have focused upon socio-economic 
9 
explanations of the conflict. For example, authors such as Peter Gibbon 
and Bernadette Devlin view the conflict in terms of class struggle. 
Gibbon has maintained that the political parties in Northern Ireland 
have effectively eliminated the class struggle from politics by focusing 
on religion11 which precludes the usual class distinctions from acting 
as a unifying element of political alignment. Instead of a conflict 
between the working class and the upper and middle classes, Protestant 
workers align with the upper and middle class Protestants against 
Catholics. The Unionist Party has been able to maintain its position of 
power because of this alignment. Bernadette Devlin concurs with .J 
Gibbon's view, writing, "Po.larized by this ploy into their religious 
sects, and set against each other the ordinary people have not been able 
to combine and fight for their real interests." 12 According to this 
10see Max Hastings, Barricades in Belfast: The Fight for Civil 
Rights in Northern Ireland (New York-;-1970) and The London Sunday Times 
Insight Team, Northern Ireland: A Report~ the Conflict (New York, 
1972). 
11Peter Gibbon, "The Dialetic of Religion and Class in Ulster," 
New Left Review, No. 55 (May-June, 1969), P• 25. 
12 Bernadette Devlin, The Price of~ Soul (New York, 1969), 
PP• 54-55. 
10 
this view, the solution to the problem in Northern Ireland is to realign 
society on the basis of class rather than on religious affiliation. 
Cornelius O'Leary points out that this hypothesis ignores the fac::t that 
trade unions have been strong in Ulster except when constitutional 
issues appear. 13 In other words, working class Protestants and 
Catholics can work for their own interests excrpt when politics are 
involved. 
One of the most comprehensive works on politics in Northern Ireland 
is Governing Without Consensus by Richard Rose. Professor Rose based 
his book on a survey called the Northern Ireland Loyalty Survey that he 
conducted in 1968. The survey was taken before the start of the major 
violence in Northern Ireland, but it is still a valuable source of 
information. Rose measured the attitudes of Catholics and Protestants 
toward each other, the regime, Great Britain, the Republic of Ireland, 
d 1 . . h h. 14 an re igion among ot er tings. Rose's survey provides an in depth 
analysis of the complicated motive variables involved in Northern 
Ireland politics and has been a major source used in this study of 
political integration. 
One author, Derek Birrell, has studied Northern Ireland in terms of 
relative deprivation. Birrell has stated that even though the Catholics 
in Northern Ireland realize that they are better off than their counter-
parts in the Republic of Ireland, they feel alienated and discriminated 
13cornelius O'Leary, "The Northern Ireland Crisis and Its 
Observers," Political guarterly, Vol. 42, No. 3 (July-Sept., 1971), 
P• 265. . 
14 Richard Rose, Governing Without Consensus: An Irish Perspective 
(Boston, 1971). 
against relative to the Protestant majority. Birrell points out that 
relative deprivation may take forms other than just economic depriva-
15 tion, such as social and political deprivation. He says that Catho.; 
11 
lies are made to feel that they are second-class citizens and that they 
do not receive the same benefits that other British citizens receive in 
other parts of the United Kingdom. It should be noted that Professor 
Rose has taken an opposite point of view regarding relative deprivation, 
writing, "Contrary to the economic determinist theory, economic dissat-
isfaction does not cause Protestants or Catholics to disapprove of the 
Constitution. 016 He has stated that just as many satisfied Catholics 
support the Constitution as those who do not. 17 
Still another approach to the Northern Ireland problem is mani-
f d . h I . h . l" h . h . 18 h" h . h h 1 este 1n t e r1s nat1ona ism ypot es1s, w 1c states tat t e rea \•, 
issue involved is neither discrimination nor relative deprivation, but a 
desire of Catholics to unite with Ireland. Liam de Paor 19 is one of 
the chief proponents of this hypothesis. The survey conducted by 
Richard Rose does not confirm the nationalism hypothesis. Although 76 
per cent of the Catholics in the sample said that t~ey thought of them-
selves as being Irish rather than British, only 14 per cent advocated 
15oerek Birrell, ''Relative Deprivation as a Factor in ·conflict in 
Northern Ireland," Sociological Review, Vol. 20, No. 3 (Aug., 1972), 
PP• 317-343. 
16 Rose, P• 290. 
17Ibid. 
18 O'Leary, P• 264. 
19 Liam de Paor, Divided Ulster (Baltimore, 1971) •. 
12 
abolishing the Border and uniting with the Republic. 20 
oiher general works that provided valuable information included 
The Northern Ireland Problem: ~ Study in Group Relations (l972) by 
Denis P. Barritt and Charles F. Carter; Ireland Since The Rising (1966) 
by Timothy Patrick Coogan; Ireland's English Question (1971) by Patrick 
O'Farrell; and~~ History Of Ireland (1966) by Roger Chauvire. 
This brief survey of the literature on Northern Ireland is not a 
repudiation of any of the approaches. It is meant only to acquaint the 
reader with them and to point out some of the important criticism that 
has.2been aimed at them. 
Methodology and Procedure 
The case study method allows the researcher to focus upon one 
particular political system and to analyze in depth the variables and 
factors involved in concepts such as political integration. Each case 
study increases our general knowledge and understanding of fundamental 
concepts. Case studies allow the political scientist to make compari-
sons between political systems and to note their uniqueness as well as 
their similarities. These comparisons help in the formulation of 
generalizations about political integration and its relation to other 
political concepts. Eventually, it is hoped that a more sophisticated 
general theory of political integration will be formulated. Case 
studies can contribute to the development of such general theories. 
The procedure involved in this thesis has been to review the 
literature on Northern Ireland to acquire an understanding of the nature 
20 Rose, P• 213. 
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of the political conflict and to identify the major elements of a 
political solution. This led to the formulation of a number of hypo-
theses concerning the causes of the conflict and how they related to 
legitimacy and political integration. In Chapter II, the problem of 
discrimination and its effects on political integration will be examined. 
The principal cleavages that exist will _also be studied, especially the 
roles of religious affiliation and Irish nationalism. The hypothesis on 
discrimination has been tested here using the available empirical data. 
Sources included aggregate data concerning employment figures, election 
results, and religious affiliation. Other sources of information 
included the Northern Ireland Loyalty Survey conducted by Richard Rose, 
the findings of various scholars on Northern Ireland politics, parlia-
mentary debates, publications of the British Government, newspaper and 
magazine accounts, reports of Royal Commissions, and the report of 
Amnesty I~ternational on the ill-treatment of political prisoners in 
Northern Ireland. The hypothesis concerning non-discriminatory factors 
has been tested by conducting a survey of the literature on the 
partition of Ii;-eland and its effects on Northern IJ:"eland. 
Chapter II+ will entail a description of the British White Paper in 
terms of its attempt to deal with the factors that have resulted in 
political malintegration in Northern Ireland. It will also evaluate the 
White Paper in terms of the adequacy of its proposals to bring about the 
desired goal of political integration. The evaluation will draw upon 
the writings of political scientists such as David Easton, Carl 
Friedrich, Robert Dahl, and others. The hypothesis which predicted the 
success of the White Paper was based upon a technical evaluation of the 
proposals contained in it. Eugene J •. Meehan has written: 
The most important contribution of political science to 
normative discussion relates to the process we call technical 
evaluation, the selection of ways and means of achieving goals. 
Such problems are not, strictly speaking, normative; they are 
empirical questions that call fo21explanations and predictions 
rather than normative judgments. 
Finally, Chapter IV will surmnarize the author's conclusions on the 
14 
conflict in Northern Ireland and the prospects for peace in the future. 
Significance of the Study 
The politics of Northern Ireland have been studied by numerous 
authors. Why then undertake still another study? Historians claim that 
each new generation rewrites history and this justifies the replications 
of earlier studies. However, the study of contemporary problems allows 
the political scientist to take into account new developments concerning 
unresolved conflicts. In the present study, the publication of the 
British White Paper is such a development. The success or failure of 
the proposals contained in the White Paper will have lasting effects on 
the future of Northern Ireland and its relationships with Great Britain 
and the Republic of Ireland. I~ is for this reason that the analysis of 
the White Paper is very important. Therefore, it is hoped that this 
thesis may cantribute in some way to an increased understanding of the 
conflict in Northern Ireland. 
21 Eugene J. Meehan, Contemporary Pqlitical Thought:, A Critical 
Study (Homewood, Illinois, 1967), P• 354. 
CHAPTER II 
THE FACTORS or MALINTEGRATION 
IN NORTHERN IRELAND 
In the first chapter, several questions were raised concerning the 
problem of political integration in No.rthern It;eland, one of which 
concerned the need to verify the existence of a malintegrated political 
system in that country. While it is not necessary to present an elabor-
ate case verifying this seemingly well-acknowledged fact, neither is it 
desir~ble to assume that the malintegration of Northern Ireland's 
political system is a truism needing no elaboration. Thus, evidence 
will be presented to establish this point. Emphasis will be given to 
the intervention of British troops, the ~evel of political violence, and 
the imposition of direct rule. 
After the presentation of evidence concerning the existence of 
political malintegration in Northern Ireland, the background to the 
conflict will be discussed. This will involve an examination of the 
political culture and the major cleavages. Next, the issues of 
legitimacy and political authority in Northern Ireland will be examined. 
The remainder of the chapter will focus on discrimination against 
Catholics, the inadequate solution of the 1920's, the issue of one party 
dominance, and the failure of Great Britain to assume its share of the 
responsibility for the governing of Northern It;eland. 
15 
16 
Malintegration in Northern Ireland 
In August of 1969, British Prime Minister Harold Wilson sent 6,000 
British troops to Northern !~eland to maintain law and order, and as a 
result, ''A. 'peace line• of corrugated iron and barbed wire was later 
stretched for three-quarters of a mile between Protestants and Catholics 
in West Belfast."1 Wilson• s action was deemed necessary because of 
rio~ing in connection with a series of civil rights marches and counter-
marches in the Belfast area. The issue of civil rights had divided the 
community into two warring camps. British soldiers were placed between 
them to insure peace a~d order. What Liam de Paor has termed a kind of 
"Berlin wa11'' 2 was erected to separate the Catholic Falls Road area from 
the Protestant Shankill Road section of Belfast. Since 1969, law and 
order have been maintained primarily by the British soldiers. The 
direct intervention by the British army into the internal affairs of 
Northern Ireland is one indication that the province is unable to settle 
its political and social disputes in an orderly and constitutional 
manner. 
The intervention of British troops is not the only indication that 
Northern Ireland has a malintegrated political system. Claude Ake has 
written that in a malintegrated political system the emphasis is on 
"effective"- rather than on ''legitimate" means of achieving political 
goals. He has stated that the level of political violence is one indi-
cation that a political system is malintegrated. Richard Rose concurs, 
1 Rose, P• 107. 
2,te Paor, P• 199. 
writing that: 
Statistics of violence are the most frequently cited 
evidence of a regime's failure to ensure the compliance with 
basic political laws. This is understandable, because 
violence !s a visible, dramatic and threatening form of 
behavior. 
The high level of political violence in Northern Ireland supports 
the malintegration hypothesis. Between the time of the British Army's 
intervention in August 1969 and July 1973, 839 persons were killed in 
4 Northern Ireland, most of them victims of Catholic and Protestant 
extremists who employed terrorist tactics to further their political 
goals. The victims of political violence have included British 
soldiers and innocent bystanders as well as persons chosen by the 
terrorists as targets for revenge. The pattern of violence is the 
17 
murder of a Protestant or a British soldier by the militant P~ovisional 
wing of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) followed by the retaliatory 
murder of a random Catholic or a suspected IRA member by the militant 
Ulster Defense Association (UDA). However, political assassinations 
have not been limited to Catholics killing Protestants or vice versa. 
The IRA has been known to execute Catholics who have collaborated with 
the Protestants or the British, even though "collaboration" .may have 
simply been to join the Ulster Defence Regiment, which is Northern 
Ireland's police force. Also, British soldiers, once considered to be 
"liberators'' by both of the warring communities, are now just as likely 
to be fired upon by Protestant extremists as by members of the I];u\. 
Tables 1 and 1-A in the appendix provide statistical evidence of the 
3 Rose, P• 29. 
4
"Chance for Compromise,". Time, Vol. 102 (July 9, 1973), P• 27. 
18 
high level of political violence. 
The imposition of direct rule by the British Govermnent is further 
evidence that Northern Ireland is politically malintegrated. The con-
stitution of Northern Ireland was written into the Government of Ireland 
Act of 1920. This Act established a regional Parliament called Stormont 
and devolved upon it most of the ordinary legislative powers such as the 
maintenance of law and order, health care, education, and .. social 
welfare. Functions such as national security and foreign policy were 
retained by the British Government, and Section 75 of the Act names the 
British Parliament at Westminster as the supreme parliament for Northern 
Ireland. On March 24, 1972, pursuant to Section 75 of the Act, the 
British Parliament enacted the Northern Ireland (Temporary Provisions) 
Act by which it assumed direct authority over the Government of Northern 
Ireland. All of the executive authority that had previously been 
exercised by the Government of Northern Ireland under Prime Minister 
Brian Faulkner was transferred to William Whitelaw, the British Secre-
tary of State for Northern Ireland. Prime Minister Faulkner and his 
Cabinet promptly resigned and the Northern Ireland Parliament was 
dissolved. 
The intervention of British troops, the high level of political 
violence, and the imposition of direct rule by the British Government 
are clear indications that Northern Ireland's political system is mal-
integrated. The following section will provide the background to the 
confiict by examining the political culture of Northern Ireland. Then, 
the cleavages that divide the people of Northern Ireland will be 
discussed. 
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The Political Culture of Northern Ireland 
In order to understand any political system, it is essential to .. 
know its political culture. Political culture is a somewhat elusive 
concept that still perplexes political scientists because, like so many 
concepts in the discipline, it cannot be observed directly. This can be 
illustrated with the concept of power. Even though power per.~ cannot 
be seen, touched, o~ accurately measured; one can tell when power is 
being exercised. Similarly, political culture cannot be seen or 
touched, and yet it is difficult to deny that it exists. Gabriel Almond 
and Sidney Verba have written that, "The political· culture of a nation 
is the particular distribution of patterns of orientation toward politi-
.cal objects among the members of a nation. 05 Almond and Verba have 
further explained that:. 
' : -
'Orientation• refers to the internalized aspects of objects and 
relationships. It includes (1) •cognitive orientation• that 
is, knowledge of and belief about the political system, its 
roles, and incumbents of these roles, its inputs and its 
outputs; (2) 'affective orientation,• or feelings about the 
political system, its roles, personnel, and performance, and 
(3) •evaluational orientation,• the judgments and opinions 
about objects that typically involve the combination ~f value 
standards and criteria with information and feelings. 
Almond and Verba's definition of political culture assumes that a 
degree of consensus exists on the nature of and feelings toward the 
political objectives of the regime or polity. They also assert that the 
political culture of a nation consists of the patterns of orientation of 
5Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Cµlture (Boston, 1965), 
P• 13. 
6Ibid., P• 14. 
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the individual members who compose the polity. 7 Knowledge of the degree 
of consensus within a political system can provide insight into the 
. 
problem of political integration. One might hypothesize that a high 
level of consensus on basic values would indicate a well integrated 
political system. Similarly, a low level of consensus would indicate a 
poorly integrated system. 
One of the most serious obstacles to political integration in 
Northern Ireland is the difference in perception of political values by 
Catholics and Protestants. Claude Ake has vividly illustrated this 
problem in reference to the political system of Ceylon. He has written: 
Nor is it easier to find cultural symbols around which 
the country may be united. Wriggins points out that when 
Ceylon cast around for a cultural symbol from ~er past, it 
was discovered that the past had no common significance for 
all Ceylonese. Ceylonese recalled battles won and lost from 
each other. What some remembered as the hour of heroism was 
remembered by others as the hour of humiliation. It was 
clear that the quest could only underline the inferiority 
and ~upet:ior:i:.ty feelings amons the various ethnic groups to 
the detriment of integration. 
Like Ceylon, Northern Ireland lacks a common cultural symbol from 
her past that has common significance for Catholics and Protestants. 
When the Protestant King, William of Orange, defeated the Catholic King, 
James II, at the Battle of the Boyne in 1690, the domination of Ireland 
by the Protestants was established. Each year the Protestants celebrate 
the victory which is, of course, a source of humiliation to Catholics. 
Many times the Orange Lodges go out of their way to insure that their 
celebration parades pass by the Catholic areas of the cities. Similar-
ly, Catholic holidays, such as Saint Patrick's Day, are a source of 
7Ibid, P• 13. 
8 Ake, P• 33. 
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annoyance to many Protestantso When Richard Rose asked the respondents 
in his Northern Ireland Loyalty Survey to agree or disagree with reasons 
for supporting the regime in Northern Ireland, he found some interesting 
results. When asked to agree or disagree with the statement that "the 
regime is good because it is what the people voted for," only 37 per 
cent of the Catholics agreed, while 74 per cent of the Protestants 
agree. Support fo:r the regime "because it gives us a Queen to rule over 
us" polled 82 per cent of the Protestants, but only 37 per cent of the 
Catholics. The belief that Northern Ireland is in the hands of men who 
are good leaders was held by 73 per cent of the Protestants and 47 per 
cent of the Catholics.9 Obviously the political socialization of the 
two communities is different, which is indicated by a statement of 
Bernadette Devlin. She has written that when she attended school, 
We learned Irish history. People who went to Protestant 
schools learned British history. We were all learning the 
same things, the same events, the same period of time, but 
the interpretations we were given were different.10 
More will be written later about the effects of education on the 
socialization process. First it is necessary to look at some of the 
cleavages that divide Northern Ireland. 
Cleavages in Northern Ireland 
Whenever a low level of political integration is present in a 
political system, the attention of any observer of that system, whether 
he is a journalist, historian, or political scientist, must focus upon 
9Rose, P• 244. 
10n 1· 60 ev in, p. • 
the cleavages that divide the political community. Douglas w. Rae an~ 
Michael Taylor have written that 11A. cleavage is merely a division of a 
community into religious groups, opinion groups, or voting groups for 
11 
example."= Rae and Taylor also distingQish between cross-cutting and 
reinforcing cleavages, writing, 
Roughly, cross-cutting cleavages assure that those persons who 
are divided by one cleavage (say, race) will be brought to-
gether by another (say religion) and vice versa. Reinforcing 
cleavages, by way of contrast, assure that those who are 
divided by one cleavage (race) _will also be divided by another 
(religion).12 
Every study of the problem of Northern Ireland refers to it as being a 
division between Catholics and Protestants. But religion in terms of 
Christian theology is not the main cleavage. Other cleavages exist and 
they reinforce one another. Examination of cleavages in Northern 
Ireland is required to gain insight into the problem of political 
integration. 
Without doubt the major cleavage in NQrthern Ireland centers on 
religion, but only in the sense of religious affiliation. Religious 
affiliation permeat_es almost every aspect of life. Richard Rose 
discovered that, 
In reality, Northern Ireland is best considered a bi-
confessional society. It is bi-confessional because nearly 
everyone identifies himself as either a Protestant or a 
Catholic. In the 1961 census, only 384 of the 1,457,000 
persons enumerated described themselves as free thinkers, 
atheists or humanists.13 
But Rose discovered something of more significance than the fact that 
11 Douglas w. Rae and M:!.chael Taylor, The Analysis of Political 
Cleavages (New Haven, 1970), P• 23. 
12Ibid., P• 13. 
13 Rose, P• 248. 
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Northern Ireland is religiously divided between Catholics and Protest-
ants. When Rose asked his respondents what they disliked about churches 
in general, only 26 per cent of the Protestant respondents named the 
doctrines and rituals of the Catholic Church; and only 5 per cent of the. 
Catholics disliked the doctrines of Protestant churches. Also, 30 per 
cent of the Protestants could not think of anything they disliked about 
the Catholic Church and 61 per cent of the Catholics found nothing that 
they disliked about Protestant churches. 14 One of the main fears that 
the Protestants have of a united Ireland is the position of the Roman 
Catholic Church in the Republic of Ireland. Fifty-eight per cent of 
Rose's Protestant respondents reported that they felt that the Catholic 
Church was either "powerful" or 11 too powerful" -in the Republic •. How-
ever, 62 per cent of the Catholics said the same thing, indicating that 
both groups are suspicious of the Catholic Church. 15 Finally, Rose 
attempted to measure religious fundamentalism (belief in a literal 
interpretation of the Bible) among Catholics and Protestants and found 
virtually no difference in the religious conservatism of the two 
16 groups. Rose's data indicates that religious doctrine or teachings 
are not the focal point of the conflict, or the cause of the cleavage •. 
Even though the problem is not a controversy over religious dogma, 
religious affiliation is a basic factor in the conflict because 
Catholics and Protestants are pitted against one another. I~ religious 
dogma is not the underlying cause of the cleavage, what are the factors 
14Ibid, P• 256. 
15Ibid, P• 257. 
161bid, P• 21. 
contributing to political malintegration? Here, it is necessary to 
examine nationalism in Northern Ireland as the root of the religious 
cleavage. 
Basil Chubb has asserted that Irish nationalism is manifested in 
three ways: ( 1) concern about the "border problem" ( 2) being anti-
British and (3) searching for a cultural identity with emphasis on the 
17 increased use of the Irish language. It should be noted that Chubb's 
analysis of Irish nationalism is valid only in the sense that being 
Irish and being Catholic are considered to be synonymous. In Northern 
Ireland the majority of the people are British and Protestant, and they 
do not favor union with the Irish Republic. The Catholic minority 
generally identifies with the Irish Republic. Richard Rose found that 
Protestants in Northern Ireland generally think of themselves as being 
either British (39 per cent) or Ulstermen (32 per cent), while only 20 
per cent think of themselves as being Irish. Conversely, 76 per cent 
of the Catholics in Northern Ireland think of themselves as being Irish 
and only 15 per cent of the Irish Catholics (that is, those Catholics 
who thought of themselves as being Irish) disapprove of the regime. 
Forty per cent of the I~ish Protestants also disapprove of the regime, 
18 but they represent only 20 per cent of the P~otestant population. 
The above cleavage then divides those citizens of Northern Ireland 
who are loyal to Great Britain and those who are not, and the religious 
cleavage constitutes a manifestation of it. In other words, Protestants 
tend to be loyal to Great Britain while Catholics do not; this is far 
17Basil Chubb, The Government and Politics of Ireland (Stanford, 
California, 1970), PP• 47-50. 
18 Rose, P• 208. 
more significant than religious affiliation because the real issue in 
Northern !~eland is its continued existence as a political entity, not 
whether the Pqpe will take over the government. Tpe Catholic national-
ists in Northern Ireland seek independence from Great Britain and union 
with the Irish Republic and have resorte~ to violence to achieve their 
goal. The so- called Provisional wing of the Irish Republic Army is the 
chief organization representing the Catholic nationalis:t position; the 
P~otestant extremists are represented by the Ulster Defense Association 
and are generally called "ultras''• Richard Rose has written:, 
The individual who favours the regime but refuses compliance 
is less familiar but very formidable. This person is an Ultra, 
an individual who supports a particular definition of the 
existing regime so strongly that he is willing to break laws, 
or even take up arms to recall it to its •true• way.19 
It is clear that these two groups of extremists are the major 
source of the violence that has occurred in Northern Ireland during the 
last four years. All attempts at reconciliation have been opposed by 
the ultras and the nationalists alike. For example, ma:ny ultras in the 
dominant Unionist Party were responsible for the downfall of Prime 
Minister Terence 0 1Neill 1 s Government. They opposed him because he 
favored a moderate approach to the issue of civil rights. The national-
ists have refused to cooperate with the British in most efforts to find 
a political solution and consistently have been just as adamant as their 
forefathers had been during "T~e Troubles'' of the early 19201 s. This 
seemingly irreconcible cleavage has been the greatest threat to the 
political stability and political integration of Northern Ireland. No 
compromise has been possible as far as these two groups are concerned 
26 
because both have been determined to achieve their goal; and victory for 
one has meant defeat for the other; no middle ground has been found. 
Other cleavages exist in Northern Ireland and one of them is the 
cleavage between the working class and the employer class. This cleav-
age also seems to run along the lines of religious affiliation as the 
bulk of the Catholics in Northern Ireland are in the working class 
while most of the employer class are Protestants. As a result, Protes-
tant workers do not unite with Catholic workers in the political struc-
ture. The P~otestant working class has been fully integrated into the 
Unionist Party because of the Party's insistence on remaining part of 
the United Kingdom, while the Catholic working class divides its support 
among the opposition parties, chiefly the Nationalist Party and the 
20 Northern Ireland Labour Party. Workers, in their approach to union-
ism, also disagree along nationalist-loyalist lines. Liam de Paor has 
written: 
A number of different traditions failed to come together in 
the [~abor] movement: for example, that of trade unionism, 
which in theory should favour the solidarity of workers, 
irrespective of creed, but which has been divided on a number 
of issues--whether, for instance, unions in Northern Ireland 
should be branches of all-Ireland unions or branches of 
British unions.21 
Another cleavage in Northern Ireland has been the urban-rural 
cleavage which exists in many societies that are becoming industrial-
ized, but its significance insofar as political integration is concerned 
has been almost negligible. Also, there is a slight generation gap 
which has been reflected in political activities. It can be clearly 
201bid.~ P• 235. 
21 de Paor, P• 141. 
seen in the fact that the fight for civil rights in Northern Ireland has 
been led by relatively young people, such as Michael Farrell, Bernadette 
Devlin, and Austin Currie. This is supported by the fact that younger 
people, both P~otestant anc;l Catholic, are more likely than older people 
to believe that Catholics are treated unfairly in Northern Ireland. 22 
So far there has been no attempt to explain the linkage of the 
cleavages in Northern Ireland. One might wonder what causes this rela-
tionship between religious affiliation and loyalty to the political 
regime. Not all of the Catholics in Northern Ireland are nationalists 
and not all of the Protestants are ultras. However, there must be some 
relationship between these two variables, since it is highly improbable 
that the fact that most of the ultras are Protestants and most of the 
nationalists are Catholics simply occurred by chance. Therefore, the 
linkage of the third variable that must be considered is the legitimacy 
of the political system. The question now is whether being a Cl!ltholic 
is related to whether a person questions and then later rejects the 
legitimacy of the existing regime. First, it is necessary t~ __ ct.arify 
what constitutes legitimacy and its relationship to political authority. 
Later the factors that have caused the Catholics in Northern Ireland to 
reject the legitimacy of the regime will be examined in greater detail. 
Legitimacy and Political Authority 
in Northern Ireland 
Fundamental to the study of political integration is the concept of 
the legitimacy of the government. Seymour Lipset has written that, 
22 Rose, P• 364. 
Legitimacy involves the capacity of a political system to 
engender and maintain the belief that existing political 
institutions are the most appropriate for the society.23 
28 
Carl Friedrich has written that legitimacy "is a very particular form of 
consensus, which revolves around the question of the right or title to 
24 
rule.". The right or title to rule, according to Friedrich, has been 
founded upon a variety of beliefs, one of which is "• • • the fact that 
those who are being ruled have expressed a preference for a person 
through voting for him in an election ••• ,., 25 He classifies four types 
of legitimacy, one of which he calls ''procedural or pragmatic". This 
type of legitimacy is based upon the performance of the political 
26 
regime. Friedrich has written that:. 
Democratic legitimacy in modern states is similarly subject to 
performance tests, especially in the economic realm, and the 
legitimacy based upon a majority's preference in an election 
may be broadened or narrowed by performance.27 
Finally, Friedrich has written that:. 
The issue of legitimacy shows, however, that there ought 
to be a measure of agreement on one fundamental, and that is 
the kind of rule that is right and sort of rul~r who is en-
titled to rule. In a deomocracy, this question:will be settled 
in a constitution (written or unwritten), and the acceptance of 
the 'rules of the game' laid down in the constitution will be 
the one basic agreement required. 28 
23 Seymour Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy," Compara-
tive Politics: Notes and Readings, eds. Roy c. Macridis and Bernard E. 
Brown (Homewood, Illinois, 1972), P• 129. 
24carl J. Friedrich, Man and His Government: An Empirical Theory 
of Politics (~ew York, 1963), ~213:° 
25Ibid.: 
26Ibid., P• 236. 
27 Ibid., 
28Ibid., P• 238. 
Closely related to legitimacy is the political authority of a 
regime. John Day, a British scholar, has explained political authority 
in terms of compliance that must be freely given by the subjects of the 
regime. Day distinguished between compliance based upon the acceptance 
of the regime's authority and compliance based upon its powers 
Men may obey through fear of being punished for disobedience 
and such action may be called involuntary. But in so far as 
men obey government through fear of punislunent, they are not 
acting because they accept the authority of the government. 
He who keeps within the law solely to avoid imprisonment (or 
flogging) is not acknowledging the authority of the government, 
but its power.29 
Day asserts further that authority also involves the use of coercive 
power and that "A.person is allowed coercive power because he can be 
trusted to use coercive power for the benefit of those who authorize 
it.n30 He states that a government that receives obediepce from most of 
its citizens can use its coercive power to force obedience from the 
"stubbornly disobedient". 31 
Carl Friedrich describes political authority in terms .. ~f,J:h~-~P~~~;::-.,., 
handler's capacity to provide reasons for his actions based upon the 
values, beliefs, and interests of the grou.p within which the po~er is 
. d 32 exercise -• Finally, Richard Rose has noted that, 
The less individuals are inclined to accept the authority 
of their regime or the more they are committed to specific 
courses of political action, then the greater is the liklihood 
29 John Day, "Authority," PQ.litical. Studies, Vol. 11, No. 3 
(Oct.~ 1963), P• 259. 
30 b'd I 1 .; P• 
32F ' d' h rie ric , 
260. 
P• 223. 
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that discord will result in a refusal to comply with basic 
political laws.33 
In summary, according to Day, Friedrich, and Rose, political 
authority: (1) involves compliance that is freely given by the sub-
jects; (2) includes coercive power that is required to be used only in 
limited situations; (3) is the belief that those having coercive power 
can be trusted; (;) includes the beliefs, values, and interests of the 
subjects; and(~) involves noncompliance by those who reject it. 
For the purposes of this study, legitimacy involves the right to 
rule; the political regime that existed in Northern Ireland prior to the 
imposition of direct rule by Great Britain was certainly legitimate if 
democratic norms, such as free elections and majority rule, are the 
criteria. However, for the c,tholics in Northern !~eland, the legiti-
macy of the government was not seen in terms of legal or democratic 
norms, but in moral terms. The Catholics have continued to reject the 
legitimacy of the government of Northern Ireland which limited the 
political authority of the regime and its capacity to rule. CQmpliance 
by a majority of Catholics was effected by the power of the government 
and not by its legitimacy. 
Earlier it was hypothesized that political, social, and economic 
discrimination on the part of the P~otestant majority was at the root of 
the failure to successfully integrate the Catholic minority and, as a 
result, the government of Northern Ireland failed to attain legitimacy 
in the eyes of that minority. Each of these three areas of discrimina-
tion will now be examined to test the hypothesis, with special emphasis 
on political discrimination. 
33 Rose, PP• 30-31. 
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Political Discrimination 
Perhaps the greatest criticism that the Catholics had against the 
political system was the practice of political discrimination against 
them. However, discrimination against Catholics has been a way of life 
in Ireland since the British firmly established control in 1690, marking 
the beginning of the P~otestant ascendancy. For example, penal laws 
that were in effect until the early 1800's prescribed, according to one 
source, that, "ljo Catholic could serve in the army, or navy, nor were 
they allowed to possess arms, to vote, to be members of Parliament or 
citizens of incorporated towns. "34 . . - The following passage summar-
izes the position of Catholics in the eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries: 
The Williamite settlement ended for a long time to come 
the possibility that a Catholic property-owning class would 
dominate Ireland. It established instead a Protestant ascen-
dancy which proceeded to consolidate its position by enacting 
a penal code against Roman Catholics designed essentially not 
to punish Catholics for their beliefs nor to convert them to 
any form of Protestantism, but to prevent them from obtaining 
as a group, property, position, influence or power •••• The 
laws on the statute books directed against Roman Catholicism 
were sufficient, had they been fully applied, to stamp it out, 
but their application was erratic and selective, designed to 
convert or ruin landowners, to restrict the numbers of the 
clergy, and to fix the association of Roman Catholicism with 
poverty, humiliation, and servitude.JS 
The struggle for political rights in Northern Ireland has focused on 
three areas: the problem of gerrymandering and voting rights in gener-
al; internment and the enforcement of the Special Powers A~t; and the 
treatment of civil rights activists and others by the police and the 
34 Roger Chauvire, ~ :S.hort History of Ireland (~ew York, 1966), 
P• 77. 
35de Paor, P• 17. 
administration of justice. 
To understand the allegations of political discrimination in 
Northern Ireland, it is essential to know something about the political 
al.ignment of Catholics and Protestants. When Ireland was partitioned 
after the passage of the Government of Ireland Act of 1920, Northern 
Ireland was left with a population of approximately 1.5 million people 
with two-thirds of them being Protestants and the remaining one-third 
being Catholics. The Protestants in Nqrthern Ireland belonged almost 
exclusively to the Unionist Party which favors the union with Great 
Britain, and the Catholics generally supported the Nationalist Party 
which opposes the union with Great Britain. T~is alignment provided the 
Unionists with a perpetual and comfortable 2-1 majority--a majority that 
had very little respect for the political rights of the minority, even 
one as large as the Catholic minority. Basic to majority rule is the 
hope entertained by the minority that it will someday become the major-
ity, but in Northern Ireland this was almost an impossibility because 
the society was divided along religious, not political lines. Unless 
mass conversions take place, the Catholics are not likely to become the 
majority in the near future. 
Gerrymandering, the practice of drawing the electoral districts so 
as to enhance the power of the majority party, is one example of the 
political discrimination which was practiced against the Catholics. 
Gerrymandering created electoral districts that concentrated the 
strength of the minority into the smallest possible number of districts 
or dispersed the minority among several districts where they were 
continually outvoted by the majority. The most blatant cases of gerry-
mandering in Northern Ireland appeared at the local level, since 
elections to the British Parliament were based on proportional repre-
sentation. For example, in the city of Londonderry in 1971, Catholics 
made up approximately 69 per cent of the population yet, on the local 
council, there were twelve Unionist members and only eight N,tionalist 
members. While it is true that not all of the Catholics belonged to the 
N,tionalist Party, Richard Rose found that only five per cent of the 
Catholics identified with the Unionist Party; 36 this means, of course, 
that one-third of the population was represented by two-thirds of the 
council's membership. John Kane has written about another gerrymandered 
area where 4,564 of 7,544 voters elected eight Unionists and 13,718 of 
15,287 voters elected eight Nationalists. 37 The Cameron Commission, 
which investigated the causes of disturbances in Northern Ireland, found 
that: 
In Londonderry County Borough, Armagh Urban District, Omagh 
Urban District and County Fermanagh a Catholic majority in the 
population was converted into a large Unionist majority on the 
Councils. ln the two Dungannon councils a very small Protes-
tant majority held two-thirds or over of the seats on the 
councils.38 
In addition to gerrymandering, other practices have been used such as 
the so-called business vote which, until it was abolished in the late 
1960's, gave additional votes to businessmen who were mostly P~otestants, 
Also, the franchise was restricted to house dwellers (as ppposed to 
,apartment or tenement d¥rellers) and, as a result, about one-fourth of 
those who could vote in the Stormont elections, in which universal adult 
36 Rose, P• 235. 
37John Kane, "Civil Rights in Northern Ii:;-eland," .Review of Politics, 
Vol. 33 (Jan.; 1971), P• 60. 
38 Cameron commission, "Disturbances in Northern !,;eland," Report of 
the Commission appointed by the Governor of Northern lfeland (Belfast, 
. ' 
1969), P• 59. 
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suffrage operated, were disenfranchised in local elections. 39 Just 
before he was forced from office in April 1969, Prime ~nister Terence 
O'Neill attempted to reform the electoral system and was successful in 
having universal adult franchise adopted for all elections; however, the 
40 
civil rights movement charged that this and other reforms were mere 
"paper reforms" which were grudgingly given. In fact, no elections have 
taken place in Nqrthern Ireland since the universal adult franchise was 
adopted. 
T~e second area of political discrimination in Northern Ireland 
relates to the issue of internment and the enforcement of the Special 
Powers Act in particular. This Act was passed in 1922 when the IRA was 
conducting an intense campaign against the partition of Ireland. lt was 
meant to be a temporary measure, but since then it has become a perma-
nent statute. Commenting on the Act, Bernadetee Devlin has written: 
~ng its many provisions is one blanket one, providing for the 
arrest of people who do anything 'calculated to be prejudicial 
to the preservation of peace or maintenance of order in 
Nqrthern !reland and not specifically provided for in the regu-
lations.'. 1 
Some of the other articles that have been especially obnoxious to the 
Catholics included provisions for: 
1) arrest without a warrant 
2) detention without a charge or trial 
3) no recourse to habeas corpus 
4) denial of any claim to a jury trial 
39 Cameron Commission Report, P• 62. 
40The Civil Rights movement basically consists of two organizations: 
The Civil Rights Association and the People's Democracy. Their goals 
include the repeal of the Special Powers Act, reapportionment of elec-
toral districts, and a new system of housing allocations. 
41 1· 118 Dev 1n, P• • 
5) entrance and search of homes without warrants and the use 
of force, any time, day or night 
6) prohibition of the circulation of any newspaper 
7) forced self-incrimination42 
The fact that many of those interned were Catholics did not escape the 
attention of members of the civil rights movement and Catholics in 
general. 
3.5 
Beyond the obvious restrictions on civil liberties that the Special 
Powers Act entailed, the treatment of those arrested has also angered 
many Catholics. Charges of police and army brutality have been very 
common. Allegations by suspected IRA terrorists of having been hooded, 
kicked, and beaten by the police has bred a feeling of contempt for the 
political authority that the police represent. Amnesty International, 
an independent organization which investigates alleged violations of 
Articles 5, 9, 18, and 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
reported that:. 
On the basis of evidence presented to it the Commission 
concluded that persons arrested under the Special Powers Act 
had been subject to brutal treatment by the security forces 
during arrest and transport. It also concluded that there 
were cases where suffering had been inflicted on those arrested 
to obtain from them confessions or information.43 
Another reason why the Catholics in Northern Ireland distrust the police 
has been illustrated by the events that occurred during a civil rights 
march in January of 1969. On a march to Londonderry, Catholic civil 
rights demonstrators were attacked by a mob of Protestants and they were 
beaten, stoned, and kicked. But, as Max Hastings reported, 
42 Kane, PP• 62- 63. 
43Amnesty International, "Report of an Epquiry into Allegations of 
Ill-Treatment Made Against the Security Fc:>rces in Northern Ireland," 
(London; 1971), P• 27. 
Most incredible of all, the police appeared utterly 
indifferent to everything that passed. Many of the police 
chatted with the P~otestants as they watched the marchers 
come up. Others stood by and watched while marchers were 
clubbed and kicked. No attempt was made to arrest the 
attackers or even to impede them.44 
What is more, many of those attacking the marchers were out of 
uniform members of the "B Specials", 45 which is an auxiliary police 
force in Northern lreland. 46 The Cameron Commission contradicted this 
as it made clear that there was no official use made of the ''B 
Spe·cials". 47 
In addition to their contentions that the police mistreated 
Catholic prisoners and refused to protect Catholics while they exercised 
their civil rights, the critics have also condemned the achninistration 
of justice. Rose has written that: 
Father Denis Faul, a Dµngannon priest, has summed up the 
problem succinctly. 'Our people are afraid of the courts. 
They believe the judicial system as it operates in the 
blatantly sectfijian conditions of life here is loaded 
against them.' 
Many Protestants on the other hand did not trust the courts because they 
claimed that the courts were allowing Catholic terrorists to go free. 
44Max Hastings, Barricades in Belfast: The Fight for Civil Rights 
in Northern Ireland (New York, 1970), PP• 86-87. 
45rhe "B Specials".or Special Constabulary is an auxiliary police 
force that is called into service during civil disorders and to help 
police the Border. This organization is almost exclusively P~otestant 
and is accused of being the military arm of the Unionist Party. Its 
disbanchnent has been one of the aims of the civil rights movement. 
46 de Paor, P• 182. 
47 Cameron Commission Report, P• 63. 
48 Rose, P• 127. 
Rose has written: 
Scepticism about the law's absence of bias in discretionary 
legal decisions is not confined to C~tholics. Protestants 
such as the Rev. Ian Paisley also voice suspicion of the 
courts and other agents of the law. Put crudely, an Ultra 
is inclined to believe that any C~tholic brought to court 
(and many who are not) are guilty of rebellion, whatever the 
charge, evidence, or verdict, and a rebel will be inclined 
to believe the same in reverse about an Ultra.49 
The belief by both segments of the conununity that the courts did not 
administer justice fairly has been unhealthy for the political system 
and has naturally undermined its political authority. 
Social Discrimination 
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Besides the above examples of political discrimination, widespread 
belief in the existence of other forms of discrimination undermined the 
legitimacy of the political system. One of these was social discrimina-
tion. This is a difficult area to examine because a certain amount of 
segregation is self-imposed. I~ other words, the clichJ that there is 
safety in numbers operates in a society such as Northern Ireland where 
co-religionists are expected to stick together in the event of trouble. 
Richard Rose has discovered some very interesting aspects of social 
relationships in Northern Ireland which provide some insight into the 
claims of social discrimination and which could help in finding a poli-
tical solution. The remainder of this section of the chapter will draw 
heavily from Rose's Northern Ireland L~yalty Survey in which he measured 
social relationships. We shall be concerned with three broad areas: 
mixed marriages, education, and housing. 
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The institution of marriage is an important step in the process of 
political integration if it serves to bring diverse elements of a 
cormnunity together so that an exchange of ideas and opinions can freely 
take place. In Northern Ireland, after three centuries of living to-
gether, there is very little intermarriage between Catholics and 
Protestants. The main reason for this situatio.n has generally been 
attributed to the Catholic Church and its views on marriage. For 
example, until recent years, a non-catholic who married a Catholic had 
to promise to raise his or her children as Catholics, and also, the 
couple had to be married in a Catholic church. Of course, the Church 
50 forbade divorces, abortions, and means of artificial birth control. 
In a country such as the United States, one of the partners might simply 
adopt the religion of his or her future spouse, but in Northern Ireland 
this is not an acceptable form of behavior. Rose sought to determine 
what effect a change of religion might have on the individual's rela~:· 
tions with his family and friends. He found that 45 per cent of those 
interviewed said that changing religion would make a big difference, 
while another 36 per cent said it would make a difference to some of 
their family and friends. Only 6 per cent said that it would make no 
difference at all. 51 These findings are substantiated by Barritt and 
Carter, who have written that nearly every church in Nqrthern Ireland 
discourages mixed marriages because of the stress that r~~igious differ-
• I 
ences puts on a marriage. 52 These church restrictions, in addition to 
·so de Paor, PP• 144-145. 
51 Rose, P• 269. 
52oenis Barritt and Charles F. Carter, The Northern Ireland 
Problem: A Study in Group Re!ations (London-;--'1972), P• 27. 
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the other reasons that the two communities have for segregating them-
selves, serve to deter young people from meeting other young people of 
the opposite religion. Consequently, intermarriage is not likely to 
happen and thus cannot serve as a means of promoting either or other 
types of integration. 
Education is another area in which there has been very little 
interaction between Catholics and Protestants. Catholics in Northern 
Ireland have insisted; as have Catholics in other countries, that 
religious instruction, which the state schools do not provide, is vital 
to the education of a child. As a result, approximately 98 per cent of 
53 primary school Catholic children attend Catholic schools, while most 
Protestant children attend the state schools. The insistence upon a 
dual school system has led to several problems and has increased 
tension. First, many Protestants have rejected the charges of discrim-
ination and segregation and have pointed out that the Catholics have 
segregated themselves in the area of education. S~cond, many Protes-
tants believe that C~tholic schools are centers of treason where hatred 
for Protestants has been taught. While it is unlikely that hatred for 
Protestants has been advocated, there is no question that history has 
been taught from a different perspective in the Catholic schools. 
Catholic schools have stressed Irish nationalism, culture; and language. 
Bernadette Devlin has reported that the Mqther Superior of her parochial 
school was a fanatical Republican who hatBd everything British. 54 
Children in Catholic schools generally have not played rugby football or 
cricket, "which are referred to by those of Nationalist opinion as 
53Ibid, P• 77. 
54Devlin, PP• 59-60. 
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'foreign', 'Protestant', or 'British' games,n 55 Consequently, the dual 
school system has resulted in a dual process of political socialization 
where Protestant children have learned to respect the Q~een and the 
Union Jack while Catholic children have learned about Ireland, Irish 
heroes, and have saluted the flag of the Irish Republic. 
One might posit that desegregation of the school system in Northern 
Ireland would promote social integration, which in turn would enhance 
political integration. Richard R9se found that 64 per cent of the adult 
population of Northern Ireland favored mixed education. S~rprisingly, 
he found that mixed education made very little difference in the extent 
to which Catholics and Protestants supported the Constitution. For 
example, C~tholics who attended mixed schools were no more inclined to 
support the Constitution than were C~tholics who attended Catholic 
schools. However; Catholics and P~otestants who attended mixed schools 
were more likely to favor compliance with basic political laws than were 
56 those who attended segregated schools. Another more s~rious problem 
with Catholic schools has been that even though they were partially 
subsidized by the State, they were overcrowded and the quality of educa-
tion was below that of secular schools. Timothy Patrick Coogan argued 
that the poorer education that they have received caused Catholics to 
continue to be the "have nots"' in Nqrthern I~eland. 57 · Finally, opposi-
tion to a single school system has been opposed by Catholics because 
55, 
· Barritt and Carter, P• 148. 
56 Rose, PP• 336-337. 
57Timothy Patrick Coogan, Ireland Since the Rising_ (~ew York, 
1966), P• 301. 
41 
many Catholic teachers have been afraid that in a single system they 
would not be hired even if discrimination in hiring teachers and other 
state employees were forbidden by the Government of Ireland Act of 1920. 
Housing is another area in which the leaders of the Catholic civil 
rights movement charged blatant discrimination. Complaints about 
housing have been two-fold: first, housing allocations have not been 
equitable and, second, housing has been assigned in a manner that main-
' 
tained segregation. Evidence concerning the first charge is contradic-
tory because, while on the one hand there seems to be enough evidence to 
support allegations of discrimination, on the other hand there is evi-
dence that Catholics actually have been favored in the allocation of 
housing. For example, in June 1968, Aµstin Currie, a Stormont MP, 
helped set off the civil rights movement by staging a sit-in in a public 
housing apartment that had been assigned to a single Protestant girl who 
was the secretary of a Unionist Party politician. Currie maintained 
that there were Catholics with families who needed the apartment more 
h 1 1 h b . d 58 tan a singe Protestant gir even ifs e was due to e marr1e. 
Timo'thy Patrick Coogan has written:. 
Of the total number of houses built in Londonderry since 
the end of the war, Catholics have received 2,212 and Protes-
tants 924. This is not so equitable as may appear because 
while the proportion of unhoused Protestants was insignifi-
cant, there were in 1965 over 2,000 Catholic families awaiting 
houses on the city's list.59 
Richard Rose was not able to either accept or reject charges of system-
atic discrimination in housing allocations. If discrimination was 
58 Rose, P• 102. 
59 Coogan, PP• 323-324. 
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' 
present, one would expect the number of Protestants in public housing to 
be greater than the number of Catholics. According to Rose's data, 
among Catholics and Protestants in each income bracket, in only one 
bracket was the proportion of Protestants higher than the proportion of 
Catholics. Rose found that :among the six county and two county borough 
housing authorities, all of which were controlled by the Unionists, the 
proportion of Catholic tenants was larger than the proportion of P~otes-
tants, even though the proportion of Pt;"otestants in the population was 
much larger in some cases. 60 Rose concluded that since housing in 
Northern Ireland generally has been poor, many Catholics and P~otestants 
have been living in slums. 61 Another possible explanation is that 
isolated cases of discrimination in housing might have resulted in 
accusations of widespread discrimination on the part of the government. 
The second charge against local housing authorities was that the 
building of houses and assignments to them followed a design calculated 
to maintain segregated neighborhoods, and this was done for political 
reasons. The Cameron Commission concluded that there was enough proof 
to substantiate this allegation. The Commission found that: 
Council housing policy has also been distorted for 
political ends in the Unionist controlled areas to which we 
specially refer. In each, houses have been built and allo-
cated in such a way that they will not disturb the political 
balance. 62 
However, it should be remembered that in a turbulent country such as 
Northern Ireland, many people have felt more comfortable in 
60 Rose, PP• 292-294. 
61I~id~, P• 294. 
62c C . . R 61 ameron ommission eport, P• • 
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neighborhoods where they have been in the majority. As a result, a type 
of self-imposed segregation bas hampered efforts to increase interaction 
between the two connnunities. 
Finally, social discrimination involves the attitudes of Catholics 
and Protestants toward each other. Protestants have considered 
Catholics to be lazy, dirty, and to produce large families which require 
increased welfare benefits at the expense of the Protestant taxpayers. 
They have considered Catholics to be subversive and not deserving of the 
political and economic benefits of living in Northern Ireland. The 
Protestants have seen themselves as hard working, industrious, and loyal 
to Great Britain. Catholics have seen themselves as the exploited 
victims of a bigoted majority. Liam de Paor bas written: 
To Catholics in Northern Ireland, on the other band, too 
many of their Protestant feliows appeared as canting bigots--
hypocrites too, for the very~.liberties they feared to lose 
for themselves they deprived others of, and the very features 
of government they deprecated in a Catholic state they main-
tained in a Protestant one.63 
The above constitutes a sampling of attitudes one encounters in almost 
every study of Northern Ireland. However, Rose's survey showed that 
73 per cent of his sample said that Ulstermen of the opposite religi~n 
were "about the same'' as themselves. In other words, most Ulstermen 
felt that persons of the opposite religion were the same as themselves, 
From this Rose concluded that Catholics and Protestants could live 
together "as long as politics is not involved. 1164 
63 de Paor, P• 144. 
64 Rose, PP• 214-215. 
Economic Discrimination 
Catholics have charged economic discrimination in both the public 
and private sectors. Protestants have responded to this by saying that 
the reasons for not hiring a person of the opposite religion is the 
belief that an employer should be able to hire whosoever he pleases, 
that each group should take care of its own, and finally, the P~otestant 
belief that Catholics are "shifty, idle, and unreliable."65 It should 
be made clear that unemployment generally has been high in Northern 
!~eland compared to Great Bfitain. I~ 1966, Northern Ireland's unem-
ployment rate was 6.1 per cent compared to only 1.5 per cent in the rest 
f h U . d K0 d 66 . f d h f f h P o t e n1te 1ng om. Rose oun tat our per cent o t e ~otes-
tants in his sample were jobless while 11 per cent of the Catholics 
were. 67 The reason for this could well be the fact that Catholi-cs have 
constituted the majority of the unskilled labor force and that they have 
been the last to be hired and the first to be fired. C~tholics have 
been understandably resentful of the high unemployment among their co-
religionists and blame it on discrimination in hiring practice. We will 
now examine the charges as they relate to both the public and private 
sectors. 
Charges of discrimination in the hiring of government employees 
have some basis in fact. For example, in 1969, Fermanagh County had a 
Catholic population of approximately 53.2 per cent, yet only about nine 
65 
. d c 94 Barritt an arter, P• • 
66 de Paor, P• 127. 
67 Rose, P• 298. 
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per cent of the 360 county employees were Catholics. 68 It seems safe to 
say that this probably was not a matter of chance. ln 1959, according 
to Barritt and Carter, 94 per cent of the top grades of Northern 
Ireland's civil service were Protestants, but these authors maintain 
that this was not unreasonable since Protestants had a 2-1 majority in 
the population, were generally ~etter educated; and had not rejected 
the legitimacy of the regime, and therefore were more likely to be hired 
· 69 than Catholics. At the local level; as in the County Fermanagh 
example given above, the spoils system operates with the winners (many 
times as a result of gerrymandering) dispensing patronage ~ositions. 
The C~eron Cotmnission came to the same conclusion when it wrote that; 
"We are satisfied that all these Unionist controlled councils have used 
and use their power to make appointments in a way which benefitted 
70 Protestants." S<> the question of discrimination in govermnent hiring 
really comes down to which arguments one wants to believe. 
There is good reason to believe that discrimination in hiring also 
existed in the private sector in Northern Ireland. In a country as 
divided as Northern Ireland; it is reasonable to expect a small busi-
nessman to hire someone of the same religion. What is more; a Protes-
tant employer who hires Catholics risks losing his business if the other 
Protestants believe that he is favoring the Catholics. Beyond that, in 
the interest of harmony, employers have found that it is better not to 
mix workers of different politics and religion in order to avoid 
68, 
· de Paor, P• 147. 
69 Barritt and C~rter, P• 100. 
70 Cameron Cotmnission R~port, p. 60. 
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71 trouble. Examples of open discrimination can be seen in signs that 
read ''Catholics need not applyu or "Catholics Ot:ilY''• Discrimination can 
also be practiced very discreetly, too. Many times an employer can 
discern the prospective employee's religion by whether he has an Irish, 
Scotch, or English surname. If that does not work, he can tell by 
asking the name of the school the prospect attended and; if the name is 
that of a saint, he must be a Catholic. 72 Such treatment of Catholics 
make·s them bitter, especially when they are accused of being lazy and 
unreliable by the very people who refuse to give them jobs. 
Thus far, we have seen evidence of alleged political, social, and 
economic discrimination against Catholics in Northern Ireland. Much of 
the evidence is either contradictory or weak. This being the case, how 
can one hold that these forms of discrimination have led to the decline 
of legitimacy of govermnent in the eyes of the Catholic minority? The 
answer lies in that:. 
Feelings of relative deprivation are important in influencing 
people's attitudes and behavior independently of whether the 
perceived degree of inequality actually exists.73 
The fact that Catholics in Northern Ireland perceive themselves as 
victims of discrimination is far more important than the reality of the 
situation in so far as political integration is concerned. Rose foµnd 
that 74 per cent of the Catholics in Northern Ireland believed that 
71Barritt and Cc11rter,. P• 100. 
72 Devlin, PP• 54-55. 
73oerek Birrell, "Relative Deprivation as a Factor in Conflict in 
Northern Ireland," Sc;,ciological Review; Vol. 20; No. 3 (Aug.; 1972),. 
P• 322. 
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scrimination existed in their country. If the Catholic minority 
els that its parks and recreational facilities are inferior to those 
Protestant neighborhoods; and if it perceives that its voice is not 
ing heard by an oppressive political system, then there is little 
ubt that sooner or later it will no longer see the existing institu-
Jns as appropriate for society. This in turn causes it to resort to 
at Ake termed "effective"· rather than "legitimate" means of achieving 
litical goals, which of course means violence. 
Nor1-Discriminatory Factors 
of Malintegration 
The existence of discrimination against Catholics in Northern 
eland is not the only factor that has led to political malintegration. 
nilarly, the existence of reinforcing cleavages does not sufficiently 
plain political malintegration. Tpere are other relevant factors 
11olved in the breakdown of the previous constitutional order. First, 
e solution to the Irish Question that was implemented in the 1920's 
rely postponed the problem of a country united by geography and 
11ided by culture. Second, throughout its fifty years of existence, 
rthern Ireland has been dominated by a single political party--the 
ionist Party. The Unionist Party has been overwhelmingly Protestant 
d for all practical purposes the Unionist Party and the Government of 
~thern Ireland have been synonymous, and this fusion of party and 
11ernment has created a situation in which the opposition parties, 
inly composed of Catholics, were constantly frustrated and defeated. 
74 Rose, P• 272. 
Third, the British Government failed to, assume its share of the 
responsibility for the governing of Northern Ireland. Instead, Britain 
allowed Northern Ireland to govern itself without proper care to insure 
that it conformed to standards in the rest of the United Kingdom. As a 
result; Britain helped to create an atmosphere that eventually led to 
political violence and malintegration. 
The S9lution of the 1920's 
The solution to the Irish question that emerged in the 1920's must 
be viewed in its historical context. The issue of Home Rule for Ireland 
had been a precarious one for British Prime Ministers because the 
P;otestant minority, concentrated in northeast Ireland, was violently 
opposed to any type of Home Rule which would subordinate it to the 
Catholic majority and the Catholics were equally determined to end 
B~itish control of their homeland. The compromise that resulted came in 
the form of the G9vernment of Ireland Act of 1920 which divided Ireland 
into two political entities with each having a regional parliament 
subordinate to the British Parliament. When this arrangement proved to 
be unacceptable to the C~tholic Nationalists, the Ifish Free State was 
created by the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921. 'Phis Treaty gave what is now 
Northern Ireland the option to opt out of the Irish Free State which it 
promptly did. Eyentually Southern Ireland declared itself to be a 
republic and Northern Ireland remained as part of the United Kingdom. 
Frank Gallagher, an Irish scholar, has maintained that the parti-
tion of Ireland was unnecessary because there were a number of safe-
guards which would have protected the rights of Protestants in a united 
Ireland. For example, 40 per cent of the seats in the Irish House of 
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Commons would have been Unionist which was more than their electoral 
strength of about 25 per cent would have given them. The Unionists were 
actually given a majority of the seats in the I~ish Senate and issues 
affecting the status of the minority would have been decided by both 
75 Houses sitting together, giving the P~otestants a virtual veto power. 
However; the Protestant Unionist could not be swayed and partition was 
imposed. 
I~ is difficult to assess the success of the partition plan that 
was implemented in the 1920's. On the one hand; it gave the Catholic 
Nationalists the Home Rule they had sought which ev:_en.:,t,ually led to 
independence. It almost certainly prevented an insurrection by the 
Unionists who were willing to rebel against Britain if Ulster was 
abandoned to the South. If, on the other hand, partition was really 
unnecessary, then the partition plan that resulted merely postponed a 
solution to the Irish question. By dividing Ireland, the Protestant 
minority in Nqrthern Ireland was able to impose its will on the Catholic 
majority. In light of the fact that Protestants who live in the 
Republic of Ireland have not suffered religious or political persecution 
at the hands of the Catholic majority, the Unionist fears were 
unfounded. Instead, the P~otestants in Northern Ireland who feared 
persecution have been oppressing the Catholics in their own country. 
This revived the Irish question which was left unresolved in the 1920's• 
75 Frank Gallagher, The Indivisible Island: T~e History of the 
Partition of Ireland (LQndon, 1957), pp~ 303~304.~ 
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One Party Government in Northern Ireland 
Robert Dahl has written that the process of democratization has "'at 
least two dimensions: public contestation and the right to partici-
76 pate.". Dahl has devised a method of classifying political systems in 
terms of the relationship between the level of public contestation and 
the level of participation. A~cording to Dahl, public contestation 
refers to the resolution of conflicts between groups or coalitions of 
groups over public policies. The alighment of the groups or coalitions 
will 'change according to the issue involved. T'p.e level of participation 
(~re accurately called the level of inclusiveness), is defined by Dahl 
in terms of the proportion of the adult population allowed to vote. 
What Dahl has termed a "polyarchy'' is a political system with a high 
level of public contestation and a high proportion of enfranchised 
adults. A political system that has a low level of public contestation 
77 
and a high level of participation is termed an "inclusive hegemony.". 
Dahl cites the Soviet Union as an example of an inclusive hegemony since 
it has universal adult suffrage and "almost no system of public contest-
ation.1178 Northern Ireland may also be classified as an inclusive 
hegemony because it has a high level of participation as far as the 
voting privilege is concerned; especially at the parliamentary level. 
However, the domination of politics in Northern Ireland by a single 
76 Robert A~ Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation~ Opposition 
(New Haven, 1971), P• 5. 
77For additional classifications, see Robert A. Dahl, Polyarchy: 
Part1cipation~ Opposition (N~w Haven, 1971), PP• 5-9. 
78tr.bici • s • 
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political party--the Unionist Party--has virtually eliminated public 
contestation. Decisions over public policies have been confined to 
deliberations within the Unionist Party itself: that is, Unionist 
Party policy has been the Government's policy and if one did not share 
the political philosophy and interests of that party; one did not 
participate in decision-making in Northern Ireland. This point is 
clearly supported by the extent to which the Unionist Party dominated 
politics in Northern Ireland. 
Table 2 in the appendix illustrated ~~e_strength of the Unionist 
Party in the parliament of Northern Ireland. Not once since the parti-
tion of Ireland in 1920 has the Unionist Party failed to form a Govern-
ment after an election. Except for tlie°!E{J;ection of 1962; the Unionists 
have always commanded at least a 2-.1 majority at S~ormont. By now it 
should be clear that Northern Ireland possessed what Rajni Kothari has 
termed a system of one party dominance. In an analysis of the Congress 
Party of India, Kothari has written: 
The fact is that we have neither a one-party system which 
assumes not only the absence but the illegality of other 
parties nor a multi-party system which assumes that no party 
is sufficiently powerful to form the government by itself.79 
As in India; one party has consistently been given a substantial 
percentage of the vote in Northern Ireland. However, the Congress Party 
has functioned as an integrating force in the Indian political system 
while the Unionist Party has not. India is a country that is divided 
along religious, linguistic, and caste lines. The Congress Party has 
79Rajni Kothari, "P~rty System," As.ian_ Political Systems, ed~. 
Betty B. Burch and Allan B. Cole (Princeton; N. J., 1968Y, P• 290. 
served as a "big tent" within which all of the diverse elements of 
Indian society have found shelter and has promoted political integration 
in India by bringing them together under one party banner and platform. 
In Northern Ireland, the Unionist Party has derived its support almost 
exclusively from the Protestant majority. Richard Rose found that 70 
per cent of the Protestants in his sample had identified with the 
Unionist Party and 95 per cent of the supporters of the Unionist Party 
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were Protestants. 
One might ask why a system of one party dominance has promoted 
integration in India and has contributed to malintegration in Northern 
Ireland. First, N9rthern Ireland is a much smaller country with fewe~ 
divisions in its population. James Madison has written: 
T~e smaller the society, the fewer probably will be the 
distinct parties and interests composing it; the fewer the 
distinct parties and interests the more frequently will a 
majority be found of the same party; and the smaller the 
nwnber of individuals composing a majority, and the smaller 
the compass within which they are placed, the more easily 
will they concert and execute their plans 9f oppression.Bl 
Second, the Congress Party was able to bring together many diverse 
elements under its organization during the quest for independence. Bu( 
in Northern Ireland the primary objective of the Unionist Party has been 
to avoid independence, an issue that divides the country. In other 
words, there has not been any issue that brings Catholics and Protes-
tants together~ Finally, the British Green Paper entitled, ''The Future 
of Northern Ireland: A. Paper for Discussion," has pointed out that: 
80 Rose, P• 235. 
81 James Madison, ttFederalist No. 10;11 The Federalist Papers, 
ed;, Clinton Ressiter (New York, 1961h P• 8~ 
The alternation of governing Parties which has for so 
long been a characteristic ef the British political system, 
and which has undoubtedly contributed in a marked degree to 
the stability of Parliamentary Government in Great Britian, 
accordingly did not exist in Northern Ireland. It is true 
that there are·other democracies; whether sovereign States 
or self-governing areas within them; of which this can also 
be said. The special feature of the Northern Ireland situa-
tion was that the great divide in political life was not 
between different viewpoin,ts cm such matters as the allo-ca-
tion of resources and the determination of priorities; but 
between two whole communities.82 
Brett has written that "+he dangerous effects of one-party govern-
t b "ha. d ,83 men cannat e over-emp sise •' Brett has suggested that the 
dominance of politics in Northern Ireland by the Unionist Party has 
created an opposition that h'as been bifter and frustrated. James 
Gallaghan, a member of the British Parliament, accurately summed up this 
problem when he said: 
I understand what all hon. Members mean when they talk oJ 
democracy and the need to preserve democratic ways. But it is 
the essence of a demo-cracy that one should be- able to ·change 
one's Govermnenc; and one of the difficulties about Northern 
Ireland is that, although theoretically orte can change one.• s 
Government, because of the frozen nature of the situation, 
there has not been anything but one Government for the last 
fifty years.84 
Another dangerous consequen~e of one party government is that the 
majority party begins to be convinced that it alone is right. Brett has 
82 . l 
"The Future of Northern It;e and: A, Paper for Dis-cuss ion,". 
(London;. 1972), pp. 4-5. The Green Paper is a publication of the 
British Government that resulted from the n,rlington Conference held 
September 25-27, 1972. Representatives from the Unionist; Alliance; 
and Northern Ireland L~bour Parties presented proposals on the future of 
Northern Ireland. Later; the proposals of the Social Demo-cratic and 
Labour Party-, the Ulster Liberal Party, and the New Ulster Movement were 
also included. Hereafter called simply the Green.Paper. 
. 
83c.E.B. Brett, "T~e Lessons of Devolution in Northern Ireland,"· 
t~PQlitical Quarterly~ XLI, No. 3 (1970), P• 272. 
84Parliamentary Debates; Commons (London: Her Majesty's Stationery 
Office; Vol. 811, Feb. 8 to Feb. 19, 1971)~ P• 1283. 
written that "The ideas, opinions and feelings of members of other 
85 parties come to seem ridiculous, fit only to be dismissed out of handJ' 
Also, a government that is assured of victory becomes less sensitive to 
publi-c opinion and ''the channels of communication with the public at 
large become clogged. 1186 Finally, the civil service loses its inde-
d d b 1 f h . . 87 pen ence an · ecomes a too . o t e maJor1ty party. In con-clusion, 
the complete domination of politics in Northern Ireland by the Unionist 
Party created a frustrated Catholic minority that has seen violen-ce as 
an alternative to the present situation. This frustration has been a 
critical factor in the political malintegration of Northern Ireland. 
The Failure of Great Britain 
The final factor in the breakdown of the constitutional order in 
Northern Ireland is the failure of Great Britain to assume full respons-
ibility for the governing of Ulster. Section 75 of the Government of 
Ireland Act of 1920 clearly :teads that: ••• the supreme authority of 
the Parliament of the United Kingdom shall remain unaffected and un-
dimished over all persons, matters, and things in Ireland and every part 
88 thereof. Section 8(b) ef the Act prohibits the making of any law that 
interfered with religious equality. 89 The first provision was made to 
dispel the fears ef the Protestants that they might be dominated by the 
Catholics after partition, even though Northern Ireland had its own 
85 Brett, P• 272. 
86Ibid. 
87 b"d 273 I 1 ., P• • 
88Q d . d P 108 uote· in ·e aor; P• • 
89 Green Paper, P• 6. 
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regional parliament. The second provision was to assure the Protestant 
minority in the South and the Catholic minority in the No~th that they 
would be protected from religious discrimination. Thus; Great Britain 
assumed responsibility under law .. for the governing of Northern Ireland. 
In practice, Great Britian failed to exercise its power as the 
supreme authority in Northern Ireland because: 
In general, the view prevailed that·, having established 
responsible if subordinate institutions in Northern Ireland 
with certain powers-, the United Kingdom Parliament and 
G9vernment should not lightly supersede or override those 
powers.90 
In debate on Northern Ireland in the British Parliament·; Michael McGuire 
admonished that body that it was shirking its duty in the governing of 
Ulster, saying: 
A lot of damage was done in the past beca&lae we were not able 
to discuss matters which we can now discuss. I recall how, 
when L was on the benches opposite·; some ot my hon. Friends 
tried to raise these issues; but were unable to do so. Iµdeed; 
a convention was established whereby one did not speak 4bout 
the affairs of Northern Ireland. Mr. Speaker would rule out 
of order. Had that convention not .grown up, many of the 91 
problems which we are now facing might have been resolved. 
The Green Paper makes it clear that the negligence of Great Britain 
haij involved the failure te insure that Utster conform to changes made 
in the rest of the United Kingdem. For example, the business vote was 
abolished in Great Britain; but allowed to remain in Northern Ireland. 
Also, N~rthern Ireland maintained a ratepayers' franchise in lCarcal · 
elections after Britain had adopted the universal adult franchise and 
d . h • • 92 remove sue restrictions. 
The reluctance of Great Britain to bacome involved in the affairs 
90 Ibid., P• 4. 
91 1· b Par iamentary_De ates; CoIIIDOns, PP• 1286-1287. 
92 Green Paper; PP• 4-5 
of Northern Ireland is understandable from the British point of view. 
The Irish question had brought the downfall of several G<;>Vernments 
prior to the 19201 s and succeeding Governments have avoided the issue 
whenever possible. Britain's main interest has been to influence the 
external affairs of Ireland because she has always considered the 
domination of Ireland by a foreign power to be a potential threat to 
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her own se-curity. For example, there was much concern among the Allies 
during the Second World War .~(hen the Republic of Ireland_ chose to remain 
neutral and refused to allow Britain to establish naval bases in 
Irelan~. For this reason, Britain has always tried to maintain a foot-
hold in Ireland and has been unwilling to antagonize Northern Ireland 
by interfering in its internal affairs. Now the situation has deter-
iorated to the point where Britain h~s been forced to abandon its 
policy of benign neglect and to intervene in the affairs of the belea-
gured province. 
The identification of the factors that have led to political 
malintegration in Northern Ireland should provide an understanding of 
the conditions necessary for a political solution. In other words, if 
discrimination has been identified as a factor involved in political 
malintegration, the removal of discrimination is a requisite to a 
political solution. The British Government• s White Paper entitled 
'-'Nc;>rthern Ireland Constitutional Proposals" has outlined a series of 
proposals for a solution to the problem of Northern I~eland. T~e next 
chapter will focus upon those proposals in light of the factors 
presented in this chapter. 
CHAPTER III 
ANANALYSIS OF .THE BRITISH WHITE PAPER 
In the introduction to the White Paper entitled, '·'Northern Ireland 
1 Constitutional Proposals," the British Government has given two reasons 
for the establishment of new political institutions in Northern Ireland. 
First, Britain hopes that the new institutions will produce wider 
consensus among the people of Northern !~eland than had previously 
existed and second, that they will provide a basis for good government 
2 
and a restoration o.f peace and order. In order to achieve these two 
goals, the proposals contained in the White Paper will have to rectify 
those conditions that led to political malintegration in Northern 
Ireland. But even if the proposals prove to be unworkable, it is signi-
ficant that the British Government has attempted a solution. Robert 
D~hl has written that:_ 
In some cases, even though the government's actions are mis-
directed, they may reduce further demands simply because these 
actions symbolized to the disadvantaged group that the govern-
ment is concerned. Indeed, it seems as least theoretically, 
possible that sometimes a government's wrong-headed but seem-
ingly well-intentioned policies may completely fail to reduce 
1 u.s. Congress, Senate, Senator Eduard Kennedy introduced into the 
record the British White Paper entit:;led, "Northern !~eland Constitt,1-:-
tional P~oposals," 93rd Cong., 1st s·ess.; March 22, 1973, Congressi<:>nal 
Reco~d, Daily Digest, S5493-S5502. ~9ditional citations will simply 
list the appropriate paragraph of the White Paper. 
2white Paper, paragraph 2(d). 
5:1 
inequalities, yet the very fact that the gov.ernment demon-
strates its ~oncern may be enough to hold, perhaps even to 
win over, the all~giance of the deprived group.3 
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Britain's response to the demands of the Catholic minority is what 
David Easton has termed a "structural regulation of support!! type of 
response. He has written that:. 
A regulative response with regard to support may include 
efforts to change the structure and processes that character-
ize a particular type of political system. This is perhaps 
the most radical strategy. It requires the system to trans-
form its goals and structures as a means of maintaining at 
least some kind of system for making authoritative alloca-
tions.4 
The purpose of the Wh_ite Paper is to outline the proposal$ that will 
bring about a transformation of Northern !~eland's goals and structures 
and establish a new system for making authoritative allocations. 
In the last chapter a number of factors were identified as contri-
buting to political malintegration in Northern-}reland. The removal of 
those factors may be described as the necessary conditions 5 needed for a 
political solution to the conflict. This type of approach has been 
termed empirical functionalism and according to Lawrence Mayer: 
This approach, exemplified by Robert K. Merton, envisions 
function as the fulfillment of a specific set of demands in 
a particular political or social system. The question there-
fore is What set of institutions fulfill a particular set of 
functions or satisfy ! specific ~ of demands in ! particular 
3oahl, P• 90. 
4navid Easton, A Framework for Political Analysis (Englewood 
Cliffs, N.J., 1965),-p. 124. 
511conditions are said to be necessary when their presence is 
essential to the occurrence of the phenomenon in question--when their 
absence would preclude its occurrence.'.' See Vernon Van Dyke, Political 
Science: A Philosophical Analysis (Stanford, 1960), P• 39. 
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~ !!!,2: el ace? 6 
In other words, once the specific set of demands are identified; what 
must be done to satisfy those demands? Specifically, how does the 
British Government plan to deal with the problem of discrimination? 
How does the White Paper propose to increase the participation of 
Catholics in the government of Northern Ireland? What will be done 
about the dominance of the Unionist Party in the political system? What 
will be the responsibilities of Great Britain under the proposals? How 
will the question of Irish unity be handled? And tinally, what will be 
done to satisfy the demands of Protestants who wish to keep Northern 
Ireland in the United Kingdom? 
The questions that were asked in the above paragraph could easily 
be answered by merely examining the proposals contained in the Whi~e 
Paper. Even though the description of the proposals is important to an 
understanding of the solution, it does not tell us whether Great ~ritain 
will achieve its goals of wider consensus and good government. In fact 
it would be impossible to completely guarantee the success or failure of 
the White Paper's proposals. Similarly, Jam~s Madison, John Jay, and 
Alexander Hamilton were unable to guarantee the successful implementa-
tion of the American Constitution, and in the Federalist Papers, they 
were predicting that the American Constitution would produce the results ,. 
they deemed desirable. Based upon their knowledge of political theory, 
practical politics, and hum.an nature, the authors of the Federalist 
Papers were evaluating and justifying the provisions in the Constitution. 
6 Lawrence c. Mayer, Comparative Political Inquiry (Homewood, 
Illinois, 1972), P• 151. Empahsis mine. 
The following analysis of the proposals contained in the British White 
Paper on Northern Ireland is not purported to be of the same scope or 
magnitude as the Federalist Papers; but an attempt to analyze the White 
Paper should be made, especially if one agrees with Robert Dahl's 
( 
observation that: 
Depending on one's point of view, it may be a so"'rce of 
professional satisfaction or a cause for reproach that 
American political scientists have in recent years largely 
fors~orn attempts to evaluate political systems in an 
explicii-t and systematic fashion.7 
Proposals on Discrimination 
Complaints of political discrimination against Catholics involved 
electoral laws, gefrymandering, the enforcement of the Special Powers 
Act, the treatment of Catholic prisoners by the authorities, and the 
administration of justice in Northern Ireland. It. should be noted that 
the Government of Northern Ireland made efforts to alleviate the civil 
rights crisis by implementing a number of political reforms prior to the 
implementing a number of political reforms prior to the imposition of 
direct rule by Great Britain. In 1971, two new election laws that 
brought Northern Ireland's franchise in line with that in Great Britain· 
were passed by Stormont. The Parliamentary Commissioner Act (Northern 
Ireland) established an ombudsman to investigate complaints by citizens 
against the central government and the Commissioner for Complaints Act 
(Northern Ireland) did the same at the local level. An act that was to 
7Robert A. Dahl, "The Evaluation of Political Systems, 11 Contem-
porary Political Science: Toward Empirical Theory, ed. Ithiel de Sola 
Po.ol (New York, 1967), P• 167. 
6t 
establish an unarmed police force was also passed but was never imple-
. . ~ .·. ) 
··---···---·a 
mented. But these reforms were "too little, too late'' for Northern 
Ireland. With this in mind, we now examine the White Paper proposals to 
end discrimination in Northern Ireland. 
Election Laws 
The Whipe Paper has proposed a new Assembly for Northern Ireland 
that will consist of 78 members elected from multi-member districts by 
the Single Transferable Vote (STV) method of proportional representa-
tion. 9 According to the White Paper, the determination of the franchise 
10 
will be an "excepted" matter that will be the responsibility of the 
United Kingdom Parliament. Since the new Assembly will not be permitted 
to legislate on the franchise, Britain will be able to reassure the 
Catholics of Northern Ireland that practices such as the business vote 
and the ratepayers' franchise shall never be reinstated in Northern 
Ireland. Laws concerning all phases of the electoral process have been 
classified as "excepted" matters (policy areas such as foreign policy 
and the administration of justice, for example) and this will prevent 
the Unionist Party from enhancing its power by the manipulation of the 
election laws and voting requirements. 
8 London Sunday Times Insight Team, Northern Ireland: A Report~ 
the Conflict (New.York, 1972), PP• 233-234. 
9whi te Paper, paragraph 41. 
10white Paper, paragraph 57. "Excepted" matters are those on which 
the Northern Ireland Assembly may never legislate. "Reserved'·' matters 
are those on which either Westminster or the Assembly may legislate. 
"Transferred'·' matters are those not classified as excepted to reserved. 
Gerrymandering 
The White Paper maintained that the immediate redrawing of elec-
toral districts would have eliminated any chance for an election in :·: 
1973. Since the British Government considered that it was necessary to 
have an election as soon as possible, the decision was made to have the 
members of the Assembly elected from the twelve electoral districts used 
in the election of Northern Ireland's representatives to the British 
Parliament. The White Paper also indicated that any future change in 
the electoral districts would be done by an impartial Boundary Commis-
sion.11 Since the adoption of proportional representation, gerrymander-
ing should ho longer be a problem because, as Carl Friedrich has 
pointed out, "proportional representation possesses the merit of getting 
rid of the difficulties as the size and structure of constituencies.n 12 
However, it should be remembered that gerrymandered districts did not 
present a serious problem at the parliamentary level, but at the local 
level. The British Government will control the composition of electoral 
districts at all levels and will participate in the drawing of local 
constituency boundaries as well. The demand for "one person, one vote" 
was an important factor in the Catholic civil rights movement and the 
guarantee of equal voting power is necessary for the development of the 
legitimacy of the government in the eyes of the Catholics. British 
control of electoral districts should assure the Catholics that the 
Government of Northern Ireland will adhere to that principle. 
11white Paper, paragraph 39. 
12carl Friedrich, Constitutional Government and Democracy (Waltham, 
Mass., 1968), P• 282. 
Law and Order 
Another area in which the Catholics felt that they were the victims 
of political discrimination has been the treatment of Catholic prisoners 
by the authorities under the Special P~wers Acto The delicate balance 
between the maintenance of law and order and the exercise of civil 
rights has made the enforcemtn of the Act an extremely sensitive issue. 
According to the White P~per, the new constitutional bill to be submit• 
ted to the British Parliament 
•• o will propose the repeal of the Special Powers Act and 
the re-enactment into law only of strictly necessary provi-
sions which, like those provisions implementing the Diplock 
Report will be operative onl! during an e~ergency and with 
the approval of Parliament.1 . 
The important aspect of this provision is that the discretionary power 
of determining just when an emergency exists will be removed from the 
hands of the Unionist dominated government of Northern Ireland. I~ 
addition, the possibility of a future Special Powers Act being enacted 
will be limited because all emergency legislation in the field of law 
and order will be reserved to the Secretary of State for Northern 
14 Ireland. The Northern Ireland Executive may act only as an advisory 
committee to the Secretary of State on matters of law and order and 
other matters reserved to the United Kingdom Government. Finally, the 
Police Authority, a body that existed under the old system, will 
continue to manage the police service. Elected representatives selected 
13white Paper, paragraph 600 The Diplock Reprot contains the find-
ings of a Royal Commission concerning the administration of justice in 
Northern Ireland. 
14wh·'· p h 67(d) ipe ~per, paragrap o 
from the Assembly will also be members of the Authority and local 
District Councils will be established to improve community-police 
1 . 15 re ations. 
The maintenance of law and order is of vital importance to future 
political integration in Northern Ireland. Equality in the treatment of 
Catholic prisoners is needed to help develop the legitimacy of the 
government in the eyes of the minority and, at the same time, it is 
extremely important that the Protestants are able to feel that the 
government is capable of maintaining law and order. The British Govern-
ment must see to it that, in coping with the demands of the catholics, 
it does not lose legitimacy in the eyes of the Protestants by seeming to 
lose effectiveness in maintaining law and order. Seymour Lipset has 
written: 
By effectiveness is meant the actual performance of a politi-
cal system, the extent to which it satisfies the basic func-
tions of government as defined by the expectations of most 
members of a society, and the expectations of powerful groups 
within it which might threaten the system, such as the armed 
forces.16 
The White Paper has made it clear that the British Government still 
intends to deal forcefully with violence and terrorism and that peaceful 
opposition to the Government will be tolerated and protected. The White 
Paper has stated that: 
Any person in Northern Ireland, whatever his political beliefs, 
may advance them peacefully without fear. But no person or 
organisation can expect to be allowed to be acting politically 
15white Paper, paragrfph 69. 
16seym.our M. Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: 
Economic Development and Pqlitical Legitimacy," Politics and Social Life: 
An Introduction to Political Behavior, eds N~lson W. Pblsby, Robert,:;--
Dentler, and PauT""A. Smith (Boston, 1963), P• 554. 
,at one moment and then, given what appears a favourable oppor-
·:-.- · .. :·):~µnity, to turn to violence and subversion.17 
In order to insure that hlUllan and political rights are respected; a 
Standing Advisor Commission on HlUllan Rights will in¥estigate charges of 
d . i . . 18 is er m1nat1on. The constitutional bill will also contain a provision 
forbidding Executive Departments of the Northern Ireland Government from 
acting in a discriminatory way. In addition, 
This statutory bar to any form of discriminatory action will 
also apply to any authority, body or agency in Northern Ire-
land which is subject to investigation by the Parliamentary 
Commissioner for Administration, the Northern Ireland Parlia-
mentary Commissioner for Administration, or the Northern 19 
Ireland Commissioner for Complaints, and to the Post Office. 
The consitutional bill will have a provision forbidding the new Assembly 
20 from making any law of a discriminatory nature, and as a final safe-
guard, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland will have the power 
to place any measure passed by the Assembly before the British Parlia-
ment. Accordif\i to the White P~per: 
If he is of the opinion that any measure either deals substan-
tially with a "reserved" matter, oi- touches incidentally on an 
"~xcepted11 matter, he will cause it to be laid before Parlia-
ment together with his recommendations relating to it, so that 
an opportunity will be offered for the will of Parliament to 
be made known. If, however; he is of the opinion that the 
measure relates solely to a "transferred" .matter and does not 
run contrary to statutory restraints, e.g., on legislation of 
a discriminatory nature, he will cause it to be submitted 
directly to the P~ivy Council.21 
17White P~~per, paragraph 93. 
18Ibid.; paragraph 104. 
19Ib.d 1 ., paragraph 77. 
20ibid., paragraph 63. 
21Ibid., paragraph 5,7. 
This provision virtually gives the Secretary of State a veto power over 
legislation passed by the Assembly and will allow the British Government 
to take positive action to prevent discriminatory practices by the 
Government of Northern Ireland. In his defense of the veto power of 
American presidents, Alexander Hamilton wrote that: 
It establishes a salutary check upon the legislative body, 
calculated to guard the community against the effects of 
faction; precipitancy, or of any .. impulse unfriendly to the 
publice go~!' which may happen to ;nfluence a majority of 
that body. 
The protection of the minority against the "'l;yranny of the major-
itY'' ,is an essential e~ement of a political solution in Northern :: . 
Ireland. The provision contained in the White P~per would seem to 
provide the Catholics with adequate guarantees that they will be 
protected against arbitrary action on the part of the P~otestants. 
However; the key element is the determination of the British Government 
to use the machinery provided to protect minority rights. 
The Administration of Justice 
The final area of political discrimination has been the administra-
tion of justice in Northern Ireland. A~ mentioned above, the Special 
Powers Act will be repealed and greater efforts will be made to protect 
human, legal, and political rights. Under the former constitutional 
1 
system, county judges; magistrates; and coroners were appointed by 
Northern Ireland Mtnisters who, of course, were usually Unionists. 
Under the new constitutional bill, these officials will be appointed by 
22Alexander Hamilton, "Federalist No. 73," The Federalist Papers, 
ed. Glinton Rossiter (New York, 1961), P• 443. ~ 
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the Lord Chancellor. The administration of justice will be an 11 excep-
ted" matter and will be the responsibility of the Secretary of State. 
The responsibility for public prosecutions will belong to the Attorney-
23 General. These proposals are clearly attempts to remove the adminis-
tration of justice from partisan and sectarian influences and to 
establish a more impartial judicial system. The importance of the 
removal of such influences in the administration of justice is that the 
judicial process must be thought to be legitimate before its actions 
are considered to be just. Garl Friedrich has written: 
Thus an interaction is apparent between legitimacy and 
justice: a just act is required to produce the legitimate 
ruler, while the legitimacy of the ruler helps render his 
actions just by providing them with the legitimacy which 
bare or brute force does not possess~24 
If the men who hold positions as judges and other officers of the courts 
in Northern Ireland are to be considered legitimate, it is essential 
that they be considered to be impartial by both communities. The 
selection of individuals who are acceptable to both Catholics and 
Protestants will be an extremely difficult task since many of the values 
and beliefs of the two groups are incompatible. The position of Great 
Britain is a precarious one since, as noted in the last chapter, each 
community feels that the other is receiving preferential treatment in 
the administration of justice. The critical question is whether the 
British Government will be able to find individuals that will be accept-
able to both communities. The extremists in both communities will never 
23white Paper, paragraph 67 (a-c) 
24F . d . h rie ric , P• 259. 
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accept judges who are appointed by the British, but the appointment of 
; 
impartial lindi viduals should be able to win the support Jr the moderates 
in Northern Ireland. 
Proposals on Social Discrimination 
The British Government has recognized the need to promote social 
reforms in Northern Ireland and has stated in the White Paper that, "In 
any part of the world an inadequate social environment breeds boredom, 
aimlessness, alienation :from society, vandalism and even violence. 1125 
The White Paper re1'1.ects a special concern with education and housing 
as they relate to social relations between the two communities in 
Northern Ireland. 
Education 
Education has often been recognized as one means of promoting 
integratiqn and in the White Paper the segregated school .system was 
identified as a :factor in the mutual distrust that exists between the 
two communities. But, it was also cautioned that: "To make the educa-
tional system itself the scapegoat :for all the ills of Northern Ireland 
would obscure problems whose origin are of a much more complex charac-
26 ter." However, after recognizing the need to end the dual school 
system, there were no positive proposals in the White Paper to deal with 
the problem and the British Government was only vaguely committed to a 
25White Paper, paragraph 27. 
26Ibid. , paragraph 20. 
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27 policy of encouraging desegration of the school system. The section 
of the White Paper on education ends with the observation that: "Unless 
in the future, a greater sense of community can be fostered amongst the 
young people of Northern Ireland, it is difficult to see how this dis-
trust can be broken down. 28 
It should be noted that a complete restructuring of the entire 
society of Northern Ireland was never the aim of the White Paper. How-
ever, the importance of the educational process in political socializa-
tion ia such that more positive action by the British Government was 
warranted. Bavid Easton has written: 
As we might expect, where the agencies of socialization from 
which the child learns, such as family or school, aree:hostile 
to the existing authorities, it is probable that he will 
absorb disaffective rather than supportive attitudes.29 
Even if the educational system is not the primary source of political 
socialization, it is still an important long term force in the fostering 
of the legitimacy of the regime and compliance with its laws. 
Housing 
As noted in Chapter II, the allocation of housing in Northern 
Ireland has had political as well as social implications. The Govern-
ment of Northern Ireland attempted to reform the housing allocation 
system by establishipg a ''points system" by which housing would be 
27Ibid., paragraph 21. 
28 b 0 d h 21 Ii., paragrap • 
29 0 d E AS t A l . f P 1·t· l L 0 f (N Y, k Davi aston, _ ys ems na ysis o ~ i ica ~ ew or, 
1965), P• 307. 
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allocated to families on the basis of need. The reform met with stiff 
opposition from within the Unionist Party and, as a result, the criteria 
established to determine need were only guidelines and the local housing 
authorities were not obligated to comply with them. 30 Plans for a 
central housing authority that would have removed housing allocations 
from local control were also resisted by members of the Unionist Govern-
31 
ment. 
It was proposed in the White Paper that a central Housing Executive 
with a "broadly based membership1132 be created to allocate housing in 
the future. The centralized Housing Executive will take housing alloca-
tions out of the hands of Unionist politicians who have a vested 
interest in maintaining homogeneous electoral districts. Catholic 
representation on the Housing Executive will provide the minority with a 
voice in the ailocation process and should help to dispel any unfair 
charges of discrimination. More importantly, the British Government 
has committed itself to replace inadequate housing in Northern Ireland33 
which has been a major problem for Catholics and Protestants alike. 
The White Paper did not offer any proposals on discrimination 
concerning housing in the private sector. There is very little the 
British Government can do about individual attitudes concerning discrim-
ination in housing. For example, Barritt and Carter have noted that 
30London Sunday Times Insight Team, PP• 233-234. 
31 Ibid., P• 161. 
32white Paper, paragraph 98. 
33rb·~· · h 26 1u .. ,, paragrap • 
11' 
there is pressure on Protestants not to sell their homes to Catholics 
and mixed neighborhoods have been considered by Protestants to be "going 
downhill.n34 It should also be remembered that until the mutual dis-
trust is broken down, neither Catholics nor Protestants are very likely 
to feel safe in a mixed neighborhood. 
Proposals on Economic Discrimination 
The White P~per has proposed vigorous action in the area of dis-
crimination in hiring in both the public and private sectors. In the 
public sector, the White Paper has stated that: 
Every public authority is required to operate under a 
fair employment code; an anti-discriminatory clause (policed 
on an extra-statutory basis by the Parliamentary Commissioner 
for Administration) is written into all Government contracts, 
and a breach of its requirements can involve removal for a 
period from the Government contract list •••• 35 
The British Government has also committed itself to a policy of physical 
reconstruction and rehabilitation of Northern Ireland's industries and 
has promised to provide additional aid in building a sounder economy for 
the province. This will include aid to boost industry and cash allot-
ments for social services such as unemployment c?mpensation. 36 
The Private Sector 
37 In the private sector, a Working Party which consisted of 
34Barritt and Carter, PP• 53-54. 
3\hite Paper, paragraph 98. 
361bid., paragraph 88. 
37 An ad hoc committee similar to a Presidential task force or 
commissioYlin the United States. 
1'}) 
representatives of government, business, and labor, submitted a list of 
recommendations to promote equal opportunity in hiring in Northern 
Ireland. Its recommendations include: (1) a rejection of a formal 
quote system in employment practices; (2) a declaration of principles 
and intent in hiring practices should be signed by representatives of 
business and labor; (3) a pamphlet entitled "Guide to Manpower Policy 
and Practices" should be distributed to businesses; and (4) an agency 
to investigate individual complaints of discrimination on religious or 
political grounds should be created. According to the Working Party, 
the Agency would also be given the power to initiate its own inquiries 
. f di . . . · b · d · d 38 into patterns o scrimination in usiness an in ustry. Finally, 
Where it is satisfied on inquiry that an unlawful discrimin-
at6n1 practice existed, the Agency would seek, through 
counciliation and other administrative procedures, to secure 
voluntary compliance with the law; but it would be able, as 
a last res~rt, to apply to the courts for a range of civil 
remedies. 3 
The provisions for positive action, including legal recourse, for 
seeking compliance with anti-discriminatory practices in employment 
should reassure Catholics of the British Government's good intentions 
in securing equality and fairness in hiring. 
The White Paper's economic proposals should act as an impetus to 
the economy of Northern Ireland and, as Carl Friedrich has pointed out, 
the performance of the political system, especially in the economic 
40 
realm, contributes to or detracts from the legitimacy of the system. 
38white Paper, paragraphs 100-103. 
39Ibid., paragraph 102(c). Emphasis added. 
4o ' d' h M d Hi G t 236 Frie ric, __!!:! ~ ~-s overnmen, P• • 
But the loyalty of the Catholic minority will never be bought with 
economic benefits alone. As Robert Dahl has noted, the effort made is 
as important as the action taken. The fact that the British Government 
has committed itself to promoting economic prosperity in Northern 
Ireland will contribute more to the legitimacy of the regime than just 
pumping money into the country without regard to other Catholic demands. 
Catholic Participation 
Because of the close relationship between religious affiliation 
41 
and party affiliation in Northern Ireland, the problem of how to 
increase Catholic participation in the decision making process and how 
to end the system of one party dominance is interconnected. The 
British Government must try to balance the need to assure the Catholics 
of an effective voice in government and the need to maintain some 
semblance of majority rule. Since the two needs have come into conflict 
in the past, the problem is especially perplexing. The constitutional 
proposals contained in the White Paper seek to remedy this problem by 
the introduction of proportional representation, the use of a strong 
Committee system in the Assembly, and the guarantee that the executive 
power of Northern Ireland will not be concentrated in the hands of 
representatives from only one community. 
Proportional Representation 
Stein Rokkan has written that: 
41 Rose, p. 235. 
In linguistically and religiously divided societies majority 
elections could clearly threaten the existence of the poli-
tical system. The introduction of some element of minority 
representation came to be seen as an essential step in a 
strategy of territorial consolidation.42 
The British Government recognized the need for "some element of minority 
representation" at the time of the partition of Ireland; thus the 
Government of Ireland Act of 1920 provided for a system of proportional 
representation in elections. The regional parliaments in Northern and 
Southern Ireland were to operate under the system but could abolish the 
system after three years, which the government of Pr.ime Minister James 
43 Craig did in Northern Ireland in 1929. 
While it is useless to speculate about what might have happened if 
proportional representation had not been abolished in Northern Ireland, 
it is significant that the re-introduction of the system was advocated 
by every political party that participate~ in the Darlington Conference 
on the future of Northern Ireland, 44 with the exception of the Unionist 
Party which naturally did not favor an electoral system that would 
reduce its political strength. The White Paper has proposed that the 
new Northern Ireland Assembly be elected by the Single Transferable Vote 
method of proportional representation. 45 In addition, the voters will 
choose their representative from multi-member districts instead of 
42stein Rokkan, Citizens, Elections, Parties: Approaches E?_.~ 
Comparative Study of the Process of Development (New York, 1970), p. 157. 
43 de Paor, P• 107. 
44Those parties were the Unionist, Alliance, Northern Ireland 
Labour, Social Democratic and Labour, Ulster Liberal and the New Ulster 
Movement. 
4Swhite Paper, paragraph 39. 
single-member districts. Stein Rokkan has written that: 
The Single Transferable Vote made little sense in single-
member constituencies but offered an alternative to party 
dominance in multi-member units. The voter was free to 
establish his own list of candidates and did not have to 
abide by any party nominations.46 
The Single Transferable Vote method allows the voter to cast only 
one vote, but allows him to rank the candidates in the order of his 
preference. In this way, if the voter's first choice is not elected, 
his second, third, or even fourth choice may eventually receive his 
vote. If the voter's first choice receives more votes than are needed 
to win, the surplus votes are divided among the remaining candidates 
75 
according to the voter's second or third choices until all of the seats 
in the multi-member constituency are filled. This method reduces the 
number of wasted votes 47 (compared to plurality systems), and allows a 
minority representation roughly equivalent to its numerical strength in 
the electorate as a whole. 
One serious problem with the Single Transferable Vote method is 
that those wishing to vote along straight party lines may still do so. 
Enid Lakeman and James o. Lambert have written that in the 1948 elec-
tions in the Republic of Ireland, 90 per cent of the non-transferable 
votes "became non-transferable when no candidate of the same party 
. d 48 remaine • " In other words, if the voter found that he could not vote 
46 Rokkan, P• 164. 
47 For an excellent example of how the Single Transferable Vote 
method works, see Enid Lakeman and James D. Lambert, Voting in Democra-
cies (London, 1959), PP• 257-269. 
48Ibid, P• 111. 
for another candidate of his particular party, he simply did not list 
a preference for any other party's candidates either and his vote became 
non-transferable. This obstacle has been avoided in Northern Ireland by 
requiring the voter to list his preferences for all of the candidates on 
49 the ballot. Now, if the voter r~fuses to list a preference for 
candidates of the other parties, his vote will not count. 
Another serious problem with the introduction of the Single Trans-
ferable Vote method is that even though the Catholics of Northern 
Ireland will be represented in proportion to their number in the popula-
tion as a whole, they will continue to be hopelessly outnumbered in the 
Assembly as long as voting and party affiliation follow religious lines 
and the population ratio remains constant. In addition, the Protestants 
have solidly supported the Unionist Party whereas the Catholics have 
divided their votes among the Nationalist, the Social Democratic and 
Labour, and the Northern Ireland Labour Parties. Consequently, there 
is a great burden placed upon these minority parties to abandon sectar-
ian causes and to begin to appeal to members of the Protestant majority 
thereby cutting into the strength of the Unionist Party. In the past 
the Unionists have tried to "out-British the British" and have been very 
successful at appealing to Protestant patriotism. Therefore, the 
minority parties must show that they are just as loyal to the new 
consitution as the Unionist Party. Once minority parties lose their 
image of being subversive, a wider range of appeals could be made on 
economic and social grounds dealing with issues of concern to both 
49uoh, Jesus, Will It Work?" Time, Vol. 102, No. 1 (July 2, 1973), 
P• 27. 
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communities. Unless significant changes are made in this area, the new 
Assembly will resemble Stormont with the Unionists enjoying a commanding 
majority and with the Opposition being weak and ineffective. 
The Committee System 
The second change proposed in the W~ite Paper was to increase 
Catholic participation in government by the use of a stronger committee 
system in the parliament of Northern Ireland. The Committees will be 
organized along functional lines according to specific areas of special-
ization wuch as Home Affairs, Public Accounts, and so forth. Each 
member of the Assembly will be assigned to a standing Committee whose 
50 
membership will reflect "the balance of parties in the Assembly." 
The chairman of each Committee will also be the head of an executive 
department in the same policy area and the department heads collectively 
will form the Executive. It is stated in the White Paper that it is not 
necessary for the Assembly to follow the procedures used either at 
Westminster or Stormont and it has been encouraged to adopt less formal 
51 procedures. 
The committee system will allow the members of the Assembly who do 
not hold positions in the E~ecutive to take a more active part in 
policy formulation. The White Paper envisions a "pre-legislation". 
stage that will allow the appropriate committee to study proposed 
52 legislation before it is presented to the entire Assembly. This 
5°whipe Paper, paragraph 44. 
511bid.; paragraph 45. 
521bid.; paragraph 44. 
procedure will allow opposition party members to express minority 
opinion on proposed legislation and to propose alternative measures 
acceptable to both communities. In addition, opposition members will 
have a greater voice in the committee's "watch-dog", function of monitor-
ing the activities of the E~ecutive because the committee as a whole 
53 
will have more power in this area. 
The use of a strong committee system in the Assembly should promote 
cooperation among its members and contribute to political integration. 
Carl Friedrich has written that: 
The political function of representative assemblies today is 
not so much the initiation of legislation as the carrying on 
of popular education and propaganda and the integration and 
coordination of conflicting interests and viewpoints. The 
representative must be a master in the art of compromise.54 
However, if the elected representative himself does not possess the 
capacity to promote the interests of his supporters in a legislative 
\ 
body, he no longer has any reason to support it or to recognize its 
legitimacy. In order to gain the support of a representative's consti-
tuents, the political regime must be considered to be legitimate by the 
representative himself. For many years the Nationalist Party members 
refused to act as the Official Opposition at Stormont because they did 
. . 1 i . 55 not recognize its eg timacy. If the new Assembly is to gain 
legitimacy in the eyes of the Catholics, it must have the support of 
its members who will then have a vested interest in convincing their 
supporters of its legitimacy. This in turn will legitimate the actions 
53Ibid. 
54F . d . h C . . 1 Go d D 309 rie ric, onstitutiona ,vernment an emocracy, P• • 
55 Rose, P• 220. 
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of the Assmeply thereby increasing the capacity of the govermnent to 
rule. 
The use1 of legislative committees also points to the need for 
minority parties to abandon their strictly sectarian appeals and to 
broaden the base of their membership. If the committees of the Assembly 
are to reflect the party balance and if the parties are divided into 
Protestant and C~tholic parties, then the Unionist Party will have a 
2-1 majority on the committees. Unless a unanimous vote is required 
for new legislation, the Unionist members of the committees would have 
very little trouble passing legislation over the objections of the 
opposition parties. Depending on the ability of the Unionist Party to 
maintain its cohesion, the c,tholic opposition parties may find them-
selves as ineffective as they were at Stormont. 
Control of the Executive 
One of the conditions that the British Govermnent will require 
before the devolution of power to the Assembly is that:, 
••• the Executive itself can no longer be solely based upon 
any single party, if that party draws its support and elected 
representation virtually entirely from only one section of a 
divided community.5° 
Since the ~xecutive will be formed by the heads of the committees of 
the Assembly, this condition guarantees that some positions of power 
will be held by members of the minority parties. It imposes a type of 
coalition govermnent with the Catholic parties representing the junio~ 
partners. This requirement is not unlike an informal requirement of 
56white Paper, paragraph 52. 
of most executives that they reflect a balance of various factions 
within the party or geographical areas within the nation. For example, 
in Belgium, the Government must reflect a balance between the Flemings 
and the Walloons because of the cultural and linguistic differences in 
57 that country. Once again, minority representation in the Executive 
of Northern Ireland is needed to instill in the minority parties• 
representatives a sense of legitimacy of the government and to recruit 
their help in establishing the legitimacy of the government among the 
minority elements in the political system. 
In conclusion, the British Government has taken a number of steps 
to promote the participation of Catholics in the government of Northern 
Ireland. Under the new sys_tem there will be a type of coalition govern-
ment which will serve to promote greater consensus among the minority 
on the legitimacy and existence of the political regime •. In addition, 
there are safeguards that will guarantee the minority a voice in the 
decision making process. But it is worth noting that the details of 
many of the proposals are sketchy or will not be developed for some 
time. Consequently, the most that has been established is the founda-
tion for a workable solution to the problem of Catholic participation. 
The Role of Great Britain 
One of the key factors cited as contributing to political malinte-
gration in Northern Ireland was the failure of Great Britain to assume 
its share of the responsibility for governing it. It should be 
57stephen Holt,~ European States (New York, 1970), PP• 270-271. 
remembered that Britain always had the authority to intervene in the 
affairs of Northern Ireland but simply chose not to do so. The violence 
that erupted in the late 19601 s forced Britain to intervene and restore 
order. In turn, Britain will be forced to play a larger role in the 
internal affairs of Northern Ireland; first, to reassure Protestants by 
its presence and second; to protect the rights of Catholics. This is a 
role that Britain does not relish but cannot avoid. 
The White Paper contains several proposals that indicate that 
Great Britain will take a more active role in the governing of Northern 
Ireland. First of all, Britain has committed itself to a policy of 
economic development of Northern Ireland58 and is also committed to 
raising social services to a level of parity with those in the rest of 
the United Kingdom. 59 The British Government will scrutinize legisla-
tion passed by the Assembly of Northern Ireland and will have the power 
to veto any deemed discriminatory by the Secretary of State. 60 Britain 
will also assume the responsibility for the ma~ntenance of law and 
61 
order. Finally, the constitutional bill will contain a list of 
"excepted'·' powers that are matters on which the Assembly will not be 
allowed to legislate. 62 These proposals indicate that Britain, in 
contrast to its past record of performance, intends to be an active 
participant in the government of Northern Ireland. 
58white P~per; paragraph 25. 
59 Ibid.; paragraph 88. 
60 9 Ibid., paragraph 5. 
61Ipid.; paragraph 2(h). 
62Ibid.; paragraph 56(a). 
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The importance of Britain's role in Northern Ireland should not be 
underestimated because its presence has been one of the few stabilizing 
factors there. It is worth noting that the extremists of both communi-
ties would like to see the British withdraw. The IRA would favor a 
British withdrawal in the hope that Ireland would eventually be re-
united. The P:rotestant "ultras'' would also favor a British withdrawal 
because they think Britain "coddles" the Catholics and they would then 
be free to deal with the IRA.in a different way. It is for this reason 
that Britain must remain in Northern Ireland until more moderate 
elements can gain control. Without the stabilizing presence of British 
troops, a civil war would be very likely. Britain must now try to 
repair the damage that fifty years of neglect has created. 
The Irish Dimension 
William Kingston has identified two key elements of a solution to 
the problem of Northern Ireland. First, any solution must seek to 
remove Unionist fears of being swallowed up by the Irish Republic and 
second, recognition must be made that eventual reunification is a desire 
of both Northern and Southern Catholics. 63 At first glance, these two 
elements would seem to be mutually exclusive, but the White Paper has 
attempted to accomodate both communities by the introduction of the so 
called "Irish Dimension.", The Irish Dimension recognizes that Northern 
Ireland and the Republic of Ireland have common problexµ.s and must 
cooperate to solve them. 
63wnliam Kingston, "Northern Ireland: The Elements of a Solu-
tion," Political Quarterly, XLIII, No. 2 ( 1972), P• 206. 
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Before any cooperation on common problems can begin; mutual trust 
must be developed between the two countries. But before that can 
happen, the Protestants in the North must be assured of the continued 
connection with the United Kingdom. The British Government has.incor-
porated a number of guarantees that are designed to do just that. On 
~rch 8, 1973, the people of Northern Ireland went to the polls to vote 
on a referendum concerning the question of Irish unity. The results 
are listed in Table 3 in the appendix. Briefly, the referendum indi-
cated an overwhelming (99 to 1),desire on the part of the people of 
Northern Ireland to remain in the United Kingdom. However, the outcome 
of the vote is somewhat misleading because a majority of the Catholic 
voters boycotted the election. The British Government was forced to 
accept the results and in the White Paper declared that:, 
In accordance with the specific pledges given by successive 
United Kingdom Governments, Northern Ireland must and will 
remain part of the United Kingdom for as long as that is the 
wish of a majority of the peopleJ but that status does not 
preclude taking into account what has been described in this 
Paper as the ''Irish Dimension.u64 
I~ addition to the guarantee to keep Northern Ireland a part of 
the United Kingdom, the White Paper also contains others as well. 
First, N9rthern Ireland is to have the same number of representatives 
in the British Parliament as it had before direct rule was imposed. 65 
Second, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland will continue to 
have cabinet rank in the British Government. 66 Third, the White Paper 
64 h" h 2(b) W 1te Paper, paragrap • Paragraph 32 repeats the pledge. 
65 b"d I_1 ., paragraph 33. 
661bid., paragraph 48. 
contains a promise that there will not be a weakening of Northern 
Ireland's links with the Crown. 67 Fourth, the ministers that comprise 
the Executive of the Government of Northern Ireland will be required to 
take an oath of allegiance before assuming office. 68 And fifth, the 
British Government has promised to take strong action against political 
t . t h"l . · ·1 l"b · 69 erroris s w 1 e attempting to respect c1v1 1 erties. These 
proposals should assure Prot~stants that cooperation between Nortp~rn 
Ireland and the Republic of Ireland will not endanger the continued 
existence of Northern Ireland as a political entity within the United 
Kingdom. 
As noted above, the guarantee of the status of Northern Ireland 
70 does not preclude the possibility of a change in that status. In the 
White Paper the British Government goes on record as favoring a 11C_<;>unc~l 
of Ireland", through which cooperation between the Republic and Northern 
Ireland can be achieved. 71 It has been stated in the White Paper that 
the provision for a Council of Ireland in the constitutional bill would 
have been unrealistic and inappropriate. Instead it has been proposed 
by the White Paper that a conference be held to discuss the possibility 
such an organization. Cooperation between the two conununities would 
include matters such as control of terrorism, joint economic policies 
and development, the promotion of tourism, and the production of 
67 Ibid., paragraph 81. 
68Ibid., paragraph 52. 
69Ibid., paragraph 58-62. 
70Il;>id., paragraph 2(b). 
71Il;>id., paragraph 110. 
electricity. Cooperation between the two countries would also require 
the recognition of the status of Northern Ireland by the Irish 
72 Republic. If at some time in the future both sides desire a union, 
the organization would be there to discuss the details. What is more 
important is that the channels of communication will be opened. 
The purpose of this chapter has been to describe and analyze the 
British solution to the problem of Northern Ireland as outlined in the 
85 
White Paper entitled, "Northern Ireland Constitutional Proposals." The 
analysis was aimed at evaluating the proposals in the White Paper in 
light of the factors that have led to political malintegration. How-
ever, the creation of the proper set of institutions i~ only the begin-
ning of the process of political integration. The final chapter will 
deal with the prospects for the future of political integration in 
Northern Ireland. 
72Ibid., paragraph 112(a). 
CHAPTER IV 
CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this study has been to examine two fundamental 
questions concerning political integration in Northern Ireland. The 
first question asked why the political system of Northern Ireland 
failed to integrate the Catholic minority, and the second asked what 
can be done to promote political integration in the province. The first 
question led to an examination of some of the factors which have 
' 
hampered political integration in Northern Ireland and to the testing 
of a number of hypotheses about the relationship between various forms 
of discrimination and the legitimacy of the Northern Ireland government. 
Factors labeled non-discriminatory were also examined in order to study 
their effects upon political integration. The second question led to 
a study of the proposals contained in the British White Paper entitled 
"Northern Ireland Constitutional Proposals." Its goal is the gradual 
political integration of the Irish nation. In other words, this study 
was concerned with the White Paper as a response to the conditions that 
had interfered with political integration in Northern Ireland. In this 
chapter conclusions regarding the prospects of political integration 
in Northern Ireland will be made on the basis of the analysis of the 
White Paper, and suggestions for further inquiry into the problem of 
political integration will be made. 
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Discrimination and Legitimacy 
There is a preponderence of evidence to support the widespread 
belief of Catholics in Northern Ireland that they have been the victims 
of discrimination in their own country. A survey of the political 
literature on Northern Ireland reveals that discrimination against the 
Catholics has been one of the most important causes of social and 
political conflict. Examples of discrimination in both the public and 
private sectors have been well documented. Conceding the widespread 
discrimination against Catholics, did this, in fact, cause the aliena-
tion of Catholics from the former Protestant regime of Northern Ireland? 
On the basis of thecoperational definitioms of legitimacy and political 
integration presented in Chapter I, it must be concluded that it did. 
Atienation from a political regime is evident from such overt 
actions as political terrorism. Obviously the members of the IRA have 
never accepted the legitimacy of the government of Northern Ireland, but 
the refusal of the majority o~ the Catholics to support terrorism or 
massive civil disobedience against the government does not necessarily 
indicate their acceptance of its legitimacy. Not every man is willing 
to lay down his life to attain his political objectives. Similarly, 
compliance with the law on the part of most of the Catholics in 
Northern Ireland does not mean that they accept the legitimacy of the 
government. It should be recalled that the legitimacy of a government 
is based upon the belief that the political regime has the right to 
govern. The right to govern must be distinguished from the coercive 
power that a political regime may command; the fact that the majority 
• 
of Catholics in Northern Ireland have remained law-abiding has been due 
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at least in part to the presence of British troops. But even if the 
British were to leave Northern Ireland, it does not necessarily follow 
that every Catholic would then take to the streets. The point is that 
a citizen niay reject the legitimacy of the political regime without 
taking positive action to bring about its demise, and the lack of 
positive endorsement by Catholics has been detrimental to political 
integration in Northern Ireland. 
If there is no overt action to indicate the rejection of the 
legitimacy of a political regime, how can it be concluded that discrim-
ination has resulted in a loss of legitimacy of the Northern Ireland 
government? A~ Carl Friedrich has pointed out, the legitimacy of a 
political regime is related to its performance. 1 One can argue that 
a citizen who perceives that he is not being afforded "equal protection 
under the law'' by his government will not be satisfied with its perform-
ance, which may cause him eventually to reject its legitimacy. The 
findings in Professor Rose's Northern Ireland Loyalty Survey indicate 
that a majority of the Catholics in the sample believed that they have 
been the object of discrimination and rated the performance of the 
Unionist Party government of Northern Ireland poorly compared to 
Protestants, who generally rated it favorably. It would seem to be 
reasonable to conclude that the existence of discrimination was a 
significant factor in the failure to gain legi~~macy of the Northern 
Ireland government which, in turn, has hindered political integration. 
The conclusion that discrimination has been a factor in the loss 
1Friedrich, Man and His Government, P• 236. 
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of legitimacy and therefore detrimental to political integration 
partially answers the first of the two fundamental questions •. Now one 
must ask whether the proposals to end discrimination contained in the 
White Paper may be expected to alleviate the problem, that is, answer 
the second fundamental question. 
Some of the proposals to end discrimination are vague, to say the 
least. For example, the proposal to desegregate the schools was, at 
best, only a weak commitment to end the dual system. But the proposals 
dealing with human and political rights are a strong assurance to the 
Catholics of the determination of the United Kingdom to insure justice 
in Northern Ireland. The proposals and promises concerning economic 
aid promise to help Catholics and Protestants alike, thereby promoting 
harmony as well as economic progress. However, the dire economic 
straits in which the United Kingdom finds itself at the present time 
could pose a $erious threat to its ability to provide the economic aid 
that has been promised to Northern Ireland. The failure of Britain to 
live up to its economic promises could exacerbate tensions if economic 
conditions should become worse and severely hamper the prospects of 
political integration. Finally, the proposals_ in the White Paper are 
weakest in the area of social relations. Government cannot legislate 
the hearts and minds of men, but it can take the moral leadership in 
the job of creating an atmosphere of mutual tolerance and respect. 
Though weakest in concrete measures, the proposals dealing w.ith social 
relations are nevertheless important in promoting political integration. 
The substance of the proposals to end discrimination have led the 
author to conclude that, taken as a whole, they will help to eliminate 
social tensions in N~rthern Ireland. 
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Non-Discriminatory Factors 
The fact that a person is not pleased with the performance of a 
political regime does not necessarily mean that he will automatically 
reject its legitimacy. A reasonable man can be expected to advance his 
demands upon society by using the norms and means provided by society. 
In addition, if he perceives that the means provided by society to 
advance his demands are just, he will be more inclined to accept his 
failure to achieve his political goals. However, if a person perceives 
the means that have been provided as being unjust and ineffective, or 
that the ''rules of the game" are being unjustly applied, he may be 
inclined to resort to "effective rather than legitimate means of pursu-
ing political goals. 112 Again the question arises whether Protestant 
dominance of the political process has impeded the process of political 
integration. The findings of the present study lead the author to 
conclude that it has. The Unionist Pa~ty, unrestrained by the British 
Government, was not responsive to the demands of the Catholics. Since 
the Unionist Party and the Government of Northern Ireland were synony-
mous in the past, it means that the Government was unresponsive. An 
unresponsive government is one that is lacking an adequate performance 
in coping with demands, which undermines the support it receives from 
its subjects. Many Catholics in Northern Ireland were sorely aware 
that adherence to the democratic norm of majority rule left them at the 
2 Ake, P• 4. 
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mercy of the Protestants. Since the legal means3 of achieving political 
goals did not work, the minority turned to more effective means of 
protest which have included terrorism as well as peaceful demonstra-
tions. 
The proposals of the White Paper lead the author to conclude that 
the dominance enjoyed by the Unionist Party has ended in Northern 
Ireland. Franchise reforms satisfy the demands of civil rights leaders 
for equal voting power (one person, one vote) and a voice in the affairs 
of Northern Ireland. The legal guarantees regarding freedom of expres-
sion in political matters and the introduction of proportional repre-
sentation will insure a fairer distribution of Catholic and Protestant 
seats in the New Assembly. Representation of minor parties on the 
committees of the Assembly will assure Catholics of a voice in their 
government to a degree not possible under the old regime. Finally, the 
occupation of positions of leadership by Catholics in the Executive of 
Northern Ireland will create a coalition government in which the 
Catholic leadership will have a vested interest. This moderating effect 
on the Catholic leadership should enhance the legitimacy of the govern-
ment in the eyes of the Catholics. 
The R9le of Great Britain 
O~e conclusion that seems inescapable is that the future of poli-
tical integration in Northern Ireland will depend to a large extent on 
3Legal is used here instead of legitimate since a terrorist may 
feel that his activities are legitimate if the government itself is 
illegitimate along with the procedures it provides for political 
action. 
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the determination of the United Kingdom to implement and enforce the 
proposals contained in the White Paper. The failure of Parliament to 
assume its responsibility in the past contributed to the conflict in 
Northern Ireland. In the future, Britain can expect to have its author-
ity challenged by both Catholic and Protestant militants. Already 
militant Protestant rep~esentatives in the new Northern Ireland Assembly 
have attacked the legitimacy of that body. The group, led by the Rev. 
Ian Paisley, has claimed that the Assembly is illegal, since it was not 
sanctioned by the old parliament that was dissolved when the British 
imposed direct rule. 4 _ Paisley and his followers have tried unsuccess-
. 5 fully to disrupt the meetings of the new Assembly. Militant Catholic 
members of the Irish Republican Army have launched a terrorist campaign 
in London, which has included the use of letter bombs. One such letter 
bomb was sent to Prime Minister Edward Heath at his official residence 
at No. 10 Downing Street. 6 The strategy is obviously aimed at forcing 
Britain's withdrawal by moving the "front'·' from Northern Ireland to 
Britain itself. 
The British Government has clearly indicated in the White Pfper 
that it has no intention of withdrawing from Northern Ireland as long 
as a majority of the P~ople there favor the British presence. Since 
terrorist activities are likely to continue in Northern Ireland during 
the transition between direct and home rule; it will be up to Britain 
4The Daily Oklahoman (August 1, 1973), P• 16. 
5Ibid. 
6
"The Bombs of Summer," Time, Vol. 102, No. 10 (Sept. 3, 1973), 
P• 37. ~~ 
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to insure that the new system has time to work. If Britain fails in 
this task the result will likely be another Irish civil war. So, while 
the proposals in the White Paper allow for future British withdrawal 
and union between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland; the 
stabilizing influence of Britain should increase the chances for 
successful political integration in Northern Ireland. For this reason, 
it is the author's opinion that Britain's determination to make the new 
constitutional system work is the key element in the future of political 
integration in Northern Ireland. 
The Role of the Republic of Ireland 
The emphasis of the present study has been on the role of Great 
Britain in the future political integration of Northern Ireland. How-
ever, this does not mean that the Republic of Ireland also does not 
have a significant role. There are several positive policies that the 
Republic must follow to assure the Protestants in Northern Ireland 
that it will respect the latter as a part of the United Kingdom. First, 
the Republic must make a greater effort to stop the IRA from using it 
as a teritorial base for terrorist raids on Northern Ireland. This is 
probably the single most important policy that will assure Protestants 
of the goodwill of the Republic. Second, the Republic must follow a 
cautious policy in reference to the Council of Ireland. Any attempt at 
cooperation between the Nortlir,and South in handling their common 
problems must not give the appearance of moving too fast or of being 
dominated by the Republic. Third, the question of union between the 
N9rth and S9uth must not be allowed to become an issue in Irish poli-
tics. Rapprochement must not be allowed to suffer because of party 
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politics in the Republic. T~ough the present study has emphasized the 
need for Great Britain to assume its responsibility for the future of 
Northern Ireland, it is equally import~nt that the Government of 
Ireland recognize its responsibilities toward the strifetorn province. 
How This Study Compares With Similar Studies 
Many of the studies on Northern Ireland have examined the problem 
of discrimination, usually with the intention of confirming or discon-
firming its existence. With varying degrees of success the case for 
discrimination against Catholics has been well documented. In his book, 
Governing Without Consensus, Professor Richard Rose has linked the 
existence of discriminatio.n to the concepts of legitimacy and authority. 
Robert Moore has studied the Northern Ireland problem in terms of race 
1 ' b h ' . 7 re ations etween t e two communities. Moore sees the solution to the 
problem in the creation of a working class movement. 8 He also main-
tains that Britain allowed the discrimination against Catholics to 
exist as the price it paid for Unionist support at Westminster. Moore 
also believes that the denial of legal, political, and social rights 
has caused the Catholic minority to reject the legitimacy of the social 
9 
order. In the present study, the variables of discrimination have 
been linked to the concept of political integration. Although legiti-
macy is certainly not the only outcome of the process of political 
7Robert Moore, "Race Relations in the Six Counties: Colonialism, 
Industrialization, and Stratification in Ireland;" Race, Vol. 14, No. 1 
(July, 1972), PP• 21-41. 
8Ibid., P• 37. 
9Ibid., P• 39. 
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authors have attempted to establish a causal relationship between 
forty-.two socio-economic variables and political stability. 14 They 
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found that t.thigher levels of ethnic pluralism, religious fractionaliza-
tion, and linguistic heterogeneity are related to higher probabilities 
15 
of both elite and communal instability." 
Future Studies of Political Integration 
A~ it often happens, the study of a particular problem raises more 
questions than it answers. The case study method has limited theoreti-
.cal av-plication and there is still much to be done before a general 
theory of political integration can be formulated. One of the diffi-
culties encountered in the study of political integration is the 
question of when a political system is integrated. The absence of 
political violence is one way of determining whether a system is inte-
grated and yet a seemingly well integrated system like the United 
States may suddenly (as did happen in many major .American cities in the 
late 1960' s) disrupt into violence. A theory of political integrat.ion 
must be able to identify latent indicators of malintegration as well as 
manifest indicators such as violence. 
Another problem with the study of political integration is the 
force of irrationality. Government officials and political scientists 
may design institutions to promote political integration and yet they 
do not. Political scientists must recognize that what seems to be a 
14 b 0 d 907 I i .,. P• • 
15 Ibid., P• 925. 
97 
perfectly logical solution may fail because of the hostility between 
the groups involved. This element of irrationality is perhaps the most 
frustrating aspect of the study of political integration. Any general 
theory of political integration must somehow cope with the human 
variables of political relationships. 
Finally, political integration is a time consuming process. There 
must be time for new institutions and procedures to become institution-
alized. Tpere must be time for connnunal hostilities to break down and 
be replaced with a sense of common identity. In a rapidly changing 
world, men are not susceptible to change and this must be recognized 
by those who exercise power and those who would restructure society. 
Much can be done in the area of survey research to provide dat~ 
for the study of political integration. For example, a survey conducted 
in Northern Ireland with the expressed intention of finding the extent 
of the relationship between discrimination and political legitimacy 
would be helpful in the understanding of political integration. Such 
a study would provide an empirical basis for the formulation of more 
explicit: generalizations about the relationship between these variables. 
While a survey to measure the relationship between discrimination and 
legitimacy in Northern Ireland would not in itself be sufficient to 
support a generalization applicable to every political system, the 
results of such a survey could be a step in the right direction. Once 
the relationships between discrimination, legitimacy, and political 
integration are more clearly defined, new factors involved in the 
process of political integration could be explored. Perhaps the 
question of the legitimacy of government is not as crucial to political 
integration as had been expected. This is not posited as a refutation 
98 
of the hypotheses presented in the present study, but simply recogni-
tion that any hypothesis may be disconfirmed at some time in the future. 
Whatever the findings of future syrveys, case studies can contribute to 
the development of general theory and can be useful in the task of 
defining more precisely concepts such as political integration. 
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TABLE I 
POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN NORTHERN IRELAND1 
Soldiers Killed R.u.c. Civilians Killed 
1971 (Including U.D.R.) Killed (Not Including IRA) 
Jan-March 6 .2 11 
April-July 4 . 4 
-
Agusut 7 28 
Sept-Dec 31 9 71 
Total 48 11 114 
TABLE 1-A 
POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN NORTHERN IRELAND1 
No. Bombs Bombs 
1971 Incidents lb~ Exploded lb. Dismantled By Army 
Jan-March 209 510 120 
April-July 476 1650 670 
August 270 960 270 
Sept-.Dec 800 6477 1740 
Total 1692 9597 2800 
1 Barritt and Carter, P• xxvii. 
Year 
1921 
1925 
1929 
19,3 
1938 
1945 
1949 
1953 
1958 
1962 
1965 
Proposition 
1 
2 
TABLE II 
UNIONIST PAR.TY STRENGTH IN THE PARLIAMENT 
OF NORTHERN IRELAND2 
Unionist and 
Independent Unionist Other 
40 
36 
40 
38 
42 
35 
39 
39 
37 
34 
36 
TABLE III 
NORTHERN IRELAND BORDER REFERENDUM3 
"Do you want Northern Ireland to 
remain part of the United Kingdom?" 
"Do you want Northern Ireland to be 
joined with the Republic of Ireland 
outside the United Kingdom?" 
All 
Parties 
12 
16 
12 
14 
10 
17 
13 
13 
15 
18 
16 
2 Brett, p. 280. 
3white Paper, paragrap.h 10. 
T 
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In Favor 
591,820 
6,463 
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